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A FIRST AMENDMENT ANALYSIS OF ANTI-
SHARIA INITIATIVES
ASMA T. UDDIN & DAVE PANTZER*
INTRODUCTION
Ten years after September 11, 2001, the American Muslim
community continues to be surrounded by a climate of fear and distrust,
largely created and promoted by a small group of anti-Muslim
organizations and individuals who, while small in number, are highly
influential in shaping the national and international perception of
Muslims. A recent report by the Center for American Progress, Fear,
nc.: The Roots of the Islamophobia Network in America, examines these
groups in detail, describing their sources of funding and the media
enablers who help amplify their message.
The individuals highlighted in the report include, among others,
the co-founders of the Stop Islamization of America organization, which
is entirely devoted to publicizing a supposed Islamic conspiracy to take
over America and deprive Americans of the fundamental rights granted
2
them by the United States Constitution.
This theme of an overpowering Islamic threat is also described
by another Islamophobia-promoting organization, the Center for Security
Policy (CSP), run by a well-known anti-Muslim activist.3 CSP's report,
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1. Wajahat Ali, Eli Clifton, Matthew Duss, Lee Fang, Scott Keyes & Faiz
Shakir, Fear, Inc.: The Roots of the Islamophobia Network in America, CENTER FOR
AMERICAN PROGRESS, 9 (Aug., 2011), http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/
2011/08/pdf/islamophobia.pdf.
2. See id at 2.
3. See id at 3.
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Shariah: The Threat to America,4 is used to promote the sort of fear that
has led several state legislatures to consider anti-Sharia bills and ballot
measures, which seek to block the consideration of Sharia-defined here
as "Islamic law"5-by American judges.
The anti-Muslim rhetoric and fear-mongering is thus not without
on-the-ground ramifications, several of them manifesting in the legal or
policy arena in the form of not just anti-Sharia initiatives, but also in
6widespread resistance to the building or expansion of mosques. In some
cases, such as the resistance facing the Islamic Center of Murfreesboro in
Murfreesboro, Tennessee, the hatred has resulted in serious cases of
arson and vandalism.'
In Part I, this article will describe the broader climate of anti-
Muslim sentiment, as promoted by the Islamophobia cottage industry. In
Part II, this article will examine the manifestations of this fear-
4. Shariah: The Threat to America, An Exercise in Competitive Analysis:
Report of Team 'B' II, THE CENTER FOR SECURITY POLICY (2010),
http://familysecuritymatters.org/publications/id.7376/pubdetail.asp.
5. The term "Sharia" in fact refers to much more than Islamic law, but it is
limited to that definition here because that is how anti-Sharia proponents define it.
See Sally Steenland, Setting the Record Straight on Sharia An Interview with Intisar
Rabb, CENTER FOR AMERICAN PROGRESS (Mar. 8, 2011), http://www.
americanprogress.org/issues/2011/03/rabb-interview.html. As Intisar Rabb has
maintained:
Sharia is the ideal law of God according to Islam. Muslims
believe that the Islamic legal system is one that aims toward
ideals of justice, fairness, and the good life. Sharia has
tremendous diversity, as jurists and learned scholars figure out
and articulate what that law is. Historically, Sharia served as a
means for political dissent against arbitrary rule. It is not a
monolithic doctrine of violence, as has been characterized in
the recently introduced Tennessee bill that would criminalize
practices of Sharia.
Id.
6. See Ali et al., supra note 1, at 29.
7. See Murfreesboro Islamic Center Vandalized, NEWS CHANNEL 5 (Jan. 18,
2010, 11:37 AM), http://www.newschannel5.com/story/ 11839442/murfreesboro-
islamic-center-vandalized?redirected=truel; Fire at Tenn. Mosque Building Site
Ruled Arson, CBS NEWS (Aug. 30, 2010 10:15 AM), http://www.cbsnews.com/
stories/2010/08/28/national/main6814690.shtml; Robbie Brown, Incidents at
Mosque in Tennessee Spread Fear, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 30, 2010, Al0, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/31/us/3 1imosque.html.
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mongering through the lens of the First Amendment. More specifically,
Part II will take a close look at the anti-Sharia bills and ballot measures
proposed by numerous states and determine the extent to which they
comply with free exercise and establishment principles and
jurisprudence.
I. THE INDIVIDUALS AND ORGANIZATIONS PERPETUATING
ISLAMOPHOBIA
The Center for American Progress defines the term
"Islamophobia" as an "exaggerated fear, hatred, and hostility toward
Islam and Muslims that is perpetuated by negative stereotypes resulting
in bias, discrimination, and the marginalization and exclusion of
Muslims from America's social, political, and civic life." Primarily five
key individuals and their organizations lead the Islamophobia campaign.9
While the names of these "misinformation experts" may be unknown to
many Americans, their collective efforts have afforded them great
influence in shaping the national and international political debate
surrounding Islam, its teachings, and its followers.10
These misinformation experts are advancing a notion of Islam as
an intrinsically violent ideology, the goal of which is to achieve
dominance over the United States and over all non-Muslims worldwide.
They seek to define Sharia as a "totalitarian ideology" and "legal-
political-military doctrine" committed to annihilating Western
civilization as we know it today. "
The network of experts is not a fledgling one whose ideas are
beginning to take root; rather, the group has exhibited a remarkable
ability to organize, coordinate, and propagate its message through
grassroots organizations that have increased in strength considerably
over the past ten years. 2 Such organizations include ACT! For America,
Stop Islamization of America, and a variety of more general
organizations that have echoed their messages.13 Stop Islamization of
8. Ali et al., supra note 1, at 9.
9. See id. at vi.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 27-28.
12. Id. at vi.
13. Id.
20121 365
America in particular seeks to incite the public's fears by constantly
maligning Islam and avowing the existence of an Islamic conspiracy bent
on destroying "American values." 4 Collectively, the groups have spread
their message in twenty-three states through various communication
vehicles; they have used "books, reports, websites, blogs and carefully
crafted talking points" that have, in turn, been utilized by other anti-
Islam grassroots organizations and some right-wing religious groups as
"propaganda for their constituency."' 5 Moreover, the Islamophobia
movement's ability to influence politicians' talking points and ancillary
issues for the upcoming 2012 elections has made mainstream what was
once considered marginal, "extremist rhetoric." 16
As strong as the grassroots organizations have become, the
Islamophobia campaign is not being waged solely on a grassroots level.' 7
There are other organizations working to promote misinformation about
Islam and Muslims; many of these organizations' leaders are well-versed
in the art of capturing the press' attention and have accessed a platform
- 8
in the media.
The Impact of Islamophobia
The group galvanizing the Islamophobia movement has had, and
continues to have, a visible impact upon America's national discourse
regarding Islam and what it teaches. The misinformation experts'
writings on Islam and multiculturalism seem to have assisted in the
creation of a worldview that paints "Islam as being at war with the West
and the West needing to be defended." 9 The group's players are steering
the national and global debates regarding Islam, and the ideas they put
forth have real consequences on the public dialogue about Muslims in
America. 20
14. Id. at 2.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. See id. at 4-5.
18. Id. at 3, 6.
19. Id. at 2.
20. Andrea Elliot, The Man Behind the Anti-Shariah Movement, N.Y. TIMES,
July 31, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/31/us/31shariah.html?
pagewanted=all.
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The influential reach of Islamophobia's proponents into the legal
and policy sphere can be seen in their campaign against what they allege
to be a threat of the infiltration of Sharia into American law. The
movement against Sharia had its first seeds planted in January of 2006
when an attorney started a group called the Society of Americans for
National Existence. On the group's website, he "proposed a law that
would make observing Sharia, which he [compared] to sedition, a felony
punishable by 20 years in prison."22 "He also began raising money to
study whether there is a link between 'Shariah-adherent behavior' in
American mosques and support for violent jibad."2 3 The project, called
"Mapping Shariah," connected the founder of the Society to the founder
of the Center for Security Policy, referenced above, who in turn linked
him to a network of "former and current government officials, security
analysts and grassroots political organizations." 24 In the summer of 2009,
the Society's founder "began writing 'American Laws for American
Courts,' a model statute that would [prohibit] state judges from
considering foreign laws or rulings that violate constitutional rights in the
United States."25 Since then, his "model legislation" banning Sharia law
has been virtually "cut and pasted" into bills in South Carolina, Texas
and Alaska.2 6
To date, "approximately seventeen states have either proposed or
passed legislation aimed at banning Sharia, or in a less direct fashion,
'foreign law.' 2 7 Oklahoma State Representative, Rex Duncan, authored
State Question 755, a constitutional amendment that appeared on the
Oklahoma ballot in November 2, 2010 and was passed by Oklahoma
28






26. Ali et al., supra note 1, at vi.
27. Anver Emon, Banning Shari'a, THE IMMANENT FRAME (Sept. 6, 2011,
11:26 AM), http://blogs.ssrc.org/tif/2011/09/06/banning-shariE2%80%98a/.
28. H.R. 1056, 52d Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Okla. 2010), available at
https://www.sos.ok.gov/documents/questions/755.pdf The final text of the State
Question that appeared on the ballot read as follows:
STATE QUESTION NO. 755
LEGISLATIVE REFERENDUM NO. 355
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decide cases, explicitly prohibiting the use of international and Sharia
law.29 Duncan, in advertising his amendment, frequently referred to it as
part of "a war for the survival of America" and "a pre-emptive strike"-
words voters likely recognized as part of the war on terror: 30 In support
of State Question 755, Florida, Act! For America, a non-profit
organization, paid for over 600,000 telephone calls to voters, featuring
the voice of a former C.I.A. Director endorsing the amendment.3 1
Duncan was not the only politician endorsing Islamophobic
rhetoric and proposing anti-Sharia bills.32 Bill Ketron, Tennessee Senator
from the 13th District, is another well-known congressman advocating
the "war on Sharia."' 3 It is no secret that the 13th District has been
struggling with a heated debate regarding the building of the mosque in
This measure amends the State Constitution. It changes a
section that deals with the courts of this state. It would amend
Article 7, Section 1. It makes courts rely on federal and state
law when deciding cases. It forbids courts from considering or
using international law. It forbids courts from considering or
using Sharia Law.
International law is also known as the law of nations. It deals
with the conduct of international organizations and
independent nations, such as countries, states and tribes. It
deals with their relationship with each other. It also deals with
some of their relationships with persons.
The law of nations is formed by the general assent of civilized
nations. Sources of international law also include international
agreements, as well as treaties.
Sharia Law is Islamic law. It is based on two principal sources,
the Koran and the teaching of Mohammed.





30. James C. McKinely, Judge Blocks Oklahoma's Ban on Using Shariah Law
in Court, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 29, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/30/us/
30oklahoma.html.
3 1. Id.
32. John Esposito & Shelia Lalwani, Fear of Sharia in Tennessee, THE




Murfreesboro.34 To many, Ketron's bill represented complete ignorance
of Sharia and Islam, primarily because "it uncritically condemns Sharia
and asserts that it represents a major threat to Tennessee;"35 a statement
that is baseless and unfounded. The bill equated Sharia with terrorism,
without any evidence to corroborate the accusation.36
The impact of the Islamophobia campaign upon the American
public's perception of Islam and Muslims is evident as well. A
Washington Post-ABC News poll taken in September of 2010 showed
that 49% of Americans held an unfavorable view of Islam, a substantial
increase from 39% in October of 2002.37 In a survey conducted as part of
a report by the Public Religion Research Institute and the Brookings
Institution entitled, "What it Means to Be American: Attitudes in an
Increasingly Diverse America 10 Years after 9/11," "[fjorty-seven
percent of survey respondents said the values of Islam are at odds with
American values." 38 When it came to Sharia law, the respondents
appeared divided. On the whole, 61% of those polled "disagreed that
Muslims want to establish Sharia law in the U.S." 39 Regarding the
question of whether Americans believe that Muslims want to establish
Sharia law in America, the report quotes the CEO of the Public Religion
Research Institute, who states, "2011 has been an enormously active year
for this question." 40 He went on to say,
Forty-nine bills have been introduced in twenty-
nine states to ban Sharia law. We asked the same
question back in February, and only 23% of
Americans agreed Muslims want to establish
[S]haria as the law of the land. That number has






37. Ali et al., supra note 1, at vi.
38. Eric Marrapodi, Poll: Many Americans uncomfortable with Muslims, CNN
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If the American public is divided as to whether Muslims are trying to
introduce Sharia law in the United States, they may not be split for long
as the Islamophobia campaign continues to spread the fear of Sharia
contagion. Part II of this paper will look at how the movement has
infiltrated not only the media but also the institutions by which our laws
are made and enforced. The language used by anti-Sharia campaigners in
bills and ballot measures will be discussed, as will the degree to which
these measures are in accordance with free exercise and establishment
principles and jurisprudence.
II. ISLAMOPHOBIA AND THE LAW: ANTI-SHARIA BILLS
As of June, 2011, there were forty-seven bills in twenty-one
states that were seeking to ban the use of Sharia and/or any category of
42international law. Louisiana and Tennessee were among the first states
to propose such bills. 4 3 When the Tennessee bill was first introduced to
the floor, it was overly broad, allowing the state's attorney general to
outlaw any "Shariah organization, if the organization knowingly adheres
to Shariah" going on to define Sharia as "any rule, precept, instruction,
or edict arising directly from the extant rulings of any of the authoritative
schools of Islamic jurisprudence of Hanafi, Maliki, Shafi'i, Hanbali,
Ja'afariya, or Salafi" and stating that these terms constitute "prima facia
Shariah without any further evidentiary showing."" In essence, this bill
would outlaw any organization that adhered to any Islamic school of
thought. As expected, there was pushback from the Muslim community,
specifically because even the regulations on how to wash before prayer
42. Bill Raftery, Bans on Court Use of Sharia/International Law: 38 of 47
Bills Died or Rejected This Session; Only I Enacted Into Law, GAVEL TO GAVEL
(June 3, 2011), http://gaveltogavel.us/site/201 1/06/03/bans-on-court-use-of-
shariainternational-law-38-of-47-bills-died-or-rejected-this-session-only-1 -enacted-
into-law/.
43. Abraham H. Foxman, Op-Ed., Shout down the Sharia Myth Makers,
JEWISH TELEGRAPH AGENCY (Aug. 10, 2011), http://www.jta.org/news/article
/2011/08/10/3088943/op-ed-shout-down-the-sharia-myth-makers.
44. See Joshua Rhett Miller, Tennessee Lawmaker Renews Fight to Make
Supporting Sharia law a Felony in the US., Fox NEWS (Mar. 2, 2011),
http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2011/03/02/tennessee-lawmaker-continue-push-
make-following-shariah-felony/; S. 1028, 107th Gen. Assemb., Ist Reg. Sess. (Tenn.
2011).
or how much money to give to the poor emanate from these same
schools of thought. 45 Since the introduction of the bill, and its subsequent
failure to pass, it has now been amended into an anti-terrorist bill, 4 6
prosecuting those who offer material or financial support to terrorist
entities, with no mention of the words Sharia or Islam.
Unfortunately, as many as twenty other states have followed the
growing trend of considering anti-Sharia legislation, taking cues from the
Tennessee legislature.48 Nationwide, of the forty-four such bills proposed
in the United States, Arizona, and Oklahoma passed such bills into law.49
While the Arizona law has not been challenged, a federal district judge
suspended Oklahoma's law shortly after it went into effect.so The Tenth
Circuit heard an appeal and upheld the Oklahoma Sharia law." The law
prohibits the consideration of Sharia and international law by Oklahoma
judges.52 Meanwhile, in June of 2011, the Michigan legislature
45. See Miller, supra note 44.
46. See Richard Yeakley, Tennessee Amends Anti-Sharia Bill, HUFFINGTON
POST (Mar. 24, 2011, 7:40 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/03/25/
tennessee-amends-antishar n 840787.html.
47. See Material Support to Designated Entities Act of 2011, 2011 Tenn. Pub.
Acts 497 (codified as amended in scattered sections of TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 39-13-
802-807 (2011)).
48. See Raftery, supra note 42.
49. See id.; H.R. 2582, 50th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2011), available at
http://www.azleg.gov/legtext/50leg/lr/bills/hb2582p.pdf; H.R. 1056, 52d Leg., 2d
Reg. Sess. (Okla. 2010), available at https://www.sos.ok.gov/documents/questions
/755.pdf.
50. See Awad v. Ziriax, 754 F. Supp. 2d 1298, 1308 (W.D. Okla. 2010), aff'd,
No. 10-6273, 2012 WL 50636 (10th Cir. 2012).; Ian Millhiser, Federal Appeals
Court to Hear Challenge to Oklahoma Anti-Sharia Amendment, THINK PROGRESS
(Sept. 12, 2011, 12:20 PM), http://thinkprogress.org/justice/2011/09/12/
316430/federal-appeals-court-to-hear-challenge-to-oklahoma-anti-sharia-
amendment/.
51. Awad, 2012 WL 50636.
52. See Okla. H.R. 1056.
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introduced an anti-Sharia bill that is still pending. All others bills have
died in either the House or Senate of each state's respective congress.54
There are three general categories into which the proposed
legislation fits. The first category is the set of bills that single out Sharia
law from all other legal traditions and describe it as treasonous and anti-
American; a category similar to the first Tennessee bill introduced. A
prime example of this type of legislation is Alabama's proposed (but
now dead) bill, which stated, "The courts shall not look to the legal
precepts of other nations or cultures. Specifically, the courts shall not
consider international law or Sharia. The provisions of this subsection
shall apply to all cases before the respective courts including, but not
limited to, cases of first impression."55 Iowa, Missouri, and New
Mexico's bills incorporated almost the exact same language in their text,
stating, "The courts shall not use the legal precepts of other nations or
cultures. Specifically, the courts shall not consider international law or
Sharia law. The provisions of this section shall apply to all cases before
the respective courts including but not limited to cases of first
impression."56 A proposed bill in Wyoming not only seeks to outlaw
Sharia law, but also aims to prohibit the judiciary from citing other states
that may permit the use of Sharia law. 7 This specific bill states:
When exercising their judicial authority the courts
of this state shall uphold and adhere to the law as
53. Bill Raftery, Bans on Court Use of Sharia/International Law: Michigan
Becomes 22nd State to Consider, Texas House Tries Again to Get Senate to Adopt,




55. H.R. 597, 2011 Leg., Ist Reg. Sess. (Ala. 2011) (Constitutional
Amendment), available at http://e-lobbyist.com/gaits/text/282975.
56. H.R. 14, 84th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Iowa 2011) (Constitutional
Amendment), available at http://coolice.legis.state.ia.us/Cool-ICE/default.asp?
Category-billinfo&Service=Billbook&menu=false&hbill=hjrl4; H.R. 31, 96th Gen.
Assemb., Ist Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2011) (Constitutional Amendment), available at
http://www.house.mo.gov/billtracking/billsill/billpdf/intro/HJR003Il.PDF; S. 18,
50th Leg., Ist Sess. (N.M. 2011) (Constitutional Amendment), available at
http://www.nmlegis.gov/Sessions/l 1 %20Regular/resolutions/senate/SJR18.pdf
57. H.R. 8, 61st Leg., Gen. Sess. (Wyo. 2011) (Constitutional Amendment),
available at http://legisweb.state.wy.us/2011/Introduced/HJ0008.pdf
372 FIRST AMENDMENT LA W RE VIEW [Vol. 10o
provided in the constitution of the United States,
the Wyoming constitution, the United States Code
and federal regulations promulgated pursuant
thereto, laws of this state, established common law
as specified by legislative enactment, and if
necessary the law of another state of the United
States provided the law of the other state does not
include Sharia law. The courts shall not consider
the legal precepts of other nations or cultures
including, without limitation, international law and
Sharia law.
The second category of anti-Sharia bills are those that list Sharia
as only one of several other traditions they are outlawing-traditions the
59
legislature believes are at odds with the American legal system. One
such bill was proposed in Arizona, where it stated that in Arizona, "[a]
court shall not use, implement, refer to or incorporate [a] tenant of any
body of religious sectarian law into any decision, finding or opinion as
controlling or influential authority., 6 0 In defining religious sectarian law,
the bill states that the term means "a tenet or body of law evolving within
and binding a specific religious sect or tribe. Religious sectarian law
58. Id. The Wyoming legislation affects not only Muslim Americans, but also
other minority groups in the United States, namely the Native American population.
See Gale Courey Toensing, Campaign Against Sharia Law a Threat to Indian
Country, INDIAN COUNTRY (Sept. 6, 2011), http://indiancountrytodaymedianetwork.
com/2011/09/06/the-racists-are-coming-campaign-against-sharia-law-a-threat-to-
indian-country-49166. Gabriel Galanda, a member of the Round Valley Indian
Tribes and partner in the law firm Galanda Broadman of Seattle, argues that anti-
Sharia legislation "threatens American Indian sovereignty, law and the government-
to-government relationship between indigenous nations and state and federal
governments." Id He goes on to add that, "[t]he various state laws being passed or
proposed would quite literally prevent any state court judge from ever considering
the laws of sovereign Indian nations, including tribal common law," and that "[a]nti-
Sharia laws also fly in the face of the United States' recent adoption of the [U.N.
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples], especially insofar as such laws
could disallow state courts from ever considering the declaration and its import
domestically." Id.
59. This version eventually died in Congress when the legislature adjourned.
See Raftery, supra note 53.
60. H.R. 2582, 15th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2011), available at
http://www.azleg.gov/legtext/50leg/lr/bills/hb2582p.pdf
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includes sharia law, canon law, halacha and karma"61 but exempts
decisions based on Anglo-American legal tradition, laws or case law
from Great Britain prior to the enactment of the statute, or the definition
of marriage as between one man and one woman, "and the principles on
which the United States was founded."62 This bill goes on to prohibit
Arizona courts from looking to any church, mosque, or synagogue
governance standards to resolve any issues regarding ownership of the
house of worship and selection of ministers and congregation leaders.63
The last category of bills is the most frequently proposed type-
the "foreign or international law bill," which refers to foreign laws
broadly and does not mention Sharia specifically. This type of legislation
is under consideration in Michigan and has passed in Arizona.
Arizona's bill defines "foreign law" as "any law, rule or legal code or
system other than the constitution, laws and ratified treaties of the United
States and the territories of the United States, or the constitution and laws
of this state."6 ' The bill goes on to maintain that:
a court, arbitrator, administrative agency or other
adjudicative, mediation or enforcement authority
shall not enforce a foreign law if doing so would
violate a right guaranteed by the constitution of this
state or of the United States or conflict with the
laws of the United States or of this State.66
6 1. Id.
62. Id This particular piece of legislation hit a roadblock with another
concerned community: namely the Orthodox Jewish community. The Jewish
community uses the beit din system to resolve issues arising under halacha, the body
of law supplementing the scripture and forming the legal part of the Talmud. Ron
Kampeas, Anti-Sharia Laws Stir Concerns that Halachah Could Be Next, THE
JEWISH WEEK (May 1, 2011), http://www.thejewishweek.com/news/national/
anti sharia laws stir concerns halachah could be next.
63. See Ariz. H.R. 2582.
64. H.R. 2064, 50th Leg., Ist Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2011), available at
http://www.azleg.gov/legtext/50leg/lr/bills/hb2064s.pdf; H.R. 1056, 52d Leg., 2d
Reg Sess. (Okla. 2010), available at https://www.sos.ok.gov/documents/questions
/755.pdf; H.R. 4769, 96th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mich. 2011), available at
http://www.legislature.mi.gov/documents/2011-2012/billintroduced/House/pdf
/201 1-HIB-4769.pdf
65. Ariz. H.R. 2064.
66. Id
[Vol. 10374 FIRST AMENDMENT LA W REVIEW
ANTI-SHARIA INITIATIVES
In addition to its implied impact on the use of Sharia law, this law raises
a concern regarding international treaties the United States may have
signed or any agreements it has executed with Native American tribes. 6 7
Florida's proposed (but now dead) bill that also fell into this
specific category was similarly vague and overly broad in nature,
blatantly prohibiting any decisions "rendered under" a "foreign law, legal
code, or system." 6 8 Additionally, a bill in Iowa defined foreign law as
including "a religious law, legal code, accord, or ruling promulgated or
made by an international organization, tribunal, or formal or informal
administrative body."69 Michigan's proposed version of this bill includes
language virtually identical to Iowa's legislation. 70 South Carolina, South
Dakota, Texas, and Missouri also had proposed bills with very similar
wording.
Oklahoma's "Save Our State Amendment"
The Oklahoma constitutional amendment, upon which this paper
primarily focuses, falls into the first category, singling out Sharia law
(and Islam) for disfavor.
On May 25, 2010, the Oklahoma legislature adopted a resolution
to place before the voters a proposed amendment to Article VII of the
72
Oklahoma Constitution. Article VII is entitled "Judicial Department"
and creates and governs Oklahoma's court system.73 Earlier in May of
2010, the resolution passed in both Oklahoma's House and Senate. 74 If
approved by the voters, the resolution would add two new subsections to
67. See Toensing, supra note 58.
68. H.R. 1273, 113th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2011), available at
http://www.flsenate.gov/Session/Bill/2011/1273.
69. H.R. 575, 84th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Iowa 2011), available at
http://e-lobbyist.com/gaits/text/348560.
70. Compare id., with H.R. 4769, 96th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mich. 2011),
available at http://www.legislature.mi.gov/documents/2011-2012/billintroduced/
House/pd/201 1-HIB-4769.pdf, with Iowa H.R. 575.
71. See Raftery, supra note 42.
72. H.R. 1056, 52nd Leg., 2nd Reg. Sess. (Okla. 2010), available at
https://www.sos.ok.gov/documents/questions/755.pdf
73. Okla. CONsT. art. VII.
74. Okla. H.R. 1056.
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Article VII, Section 1 of the Oklahoma Constitution. The effect of these
changes would be to enumerate and restrict the sources of law which
76Oklahoma courts are permitted to consider in deciding cases.
Specifically, Oklahoma courts would be forbidden from "consider[ing]
international law or Sharia Law."77 The resolution laid out the text of the
proposed constitutional amendment as well as a Ballot Title, a proposed
official description of the amendment to appear on the ballot.78 The
resolution was filed with the Secretary of State on May 25, 2010.79
The final text of the State Question that appeared on the ballot is
as follows:
STATE QUESTION NO. 755
LEGISLATIVE REFERENDUM NO. 355
This measure amends the State Constitution. It
changes a section that deals with the courts of this
state. It would amend Article 7, Section 1. It makes
courts rely on federal and state law when deciding
cases. It forbids courts from considering or using
international law. It forbids courts from
considering or using Sharia Law.
International law is also known as the law of
nations. It deals with the conduct of international
organizations and independent nations, such as
countries, states and tribes. It deals with their
relationship with each other. It also deals with
some of their relationships with persons.
The law of nations is formed by the general assent
of civilized nations. Sources of international law
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Sharia Law is Islamic law. It is based on two
principal sources, the Koran and the teaching of
Mohammed.
SHALL THE PROPOSAL BE APPROVED?
FOR THE PROPOSAL-YES
AGAINST THE PROPOSAL-NOs
The two subsections sought to be added to the Oklahoma Constitution
provide as follows:
B. Subsection C of this section shall be known as
the "Save Our State Amendment".
C. The Courts provided for in subsection A of this
section when exercising their judicial authority,
shall uphold and adhere to the law as provided in
the United States Constitution, the Oklahoma
Constitution, the United States Code, federal
regulations promulgated pursuant thereto,
established common law, the Oklahoma Statutes
and rules promulgated pursuant thereto, and if
necessary the law of another state of the United
States provided the law of the other state does not
include Sharia Law, in making judicial decisions.
The courts shall not look to the legal precepts of
other nations or cultures. Specifically, the courts
shall not consider international law or Sharia Law.
The provisions of this subsection shall apply to all
cases before the respective courts including, but not
. . .81
limited to, cases of first impression.
The house and senate bills creating Question 755 passed in those bodies
by overwhelming and bipartisan margins.82 A July, 2010 poll found that
nearly half of likely voters favored the measure, and that over a quarter
80. Letter from The Honorable Drew Edmondson, Att'y Gen., Okla. to M.
Susan Savage, Sec'y of State, Okla. (June 24, 2010), available at
https://www.sos.ok.gov/documents/questions/755.pdf.
81. Okla. H.R. 1056.
8 2. Id.
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were undecided. However, when presented on the ballot, the State
Question passed by a wide margin.84 Nearly seven hundred thousand
85
Oklahomans voted yes, while fewer than half that number voted no.
The Constitutional Context: The Religious Liberty Protections of the
First Amendment
The First Amendment to the United States Constitution provides
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech,
or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to
petition the Government for a redress of grievances." The very first
words of the Amendment create what are known as the Establishment
Clause and the Free Exercise Clause. 87 These two clauses set up the
guidelines for the relationship between the state and religion in the
United States.88
The guidelines these provisions create work as follows: the
Establishment Clause maintains that the government may not officially
choose between religions-and in some interpretations, between religion
and non-religion-in creating law.89 The Free Exercise Clause says that
the government may not generally prevent a person from believing and
advocating a religious message; nor may the government prevent
83. Patrick B. McGuigan, State Question 755 would ban use offoreign judicial
rulings, CAPITOLBEATOK (Sept. 2, 2010) http://www.capitolbeatok.com/_webapp
3337864/State Question 755 would ban use of foreignjudicialrulings.
84. OKLA. STATE ELECTION BD., Summary Results: General Election-
November 2, 2010, OK.GOv (Nov. 2, 2010), http://www.ok.gov/elections/
support/I Ogen.html.
85. Id.
86. U.S. CONsT. amend. 1.
87. Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 205 (1963).
88. Id. at 305 (Goldberg, J., concurring) ("The basic purpose of the religion
clause of the First Amendment is to promote and assure the fullest possible scope of
religious liberty and tolerance for all and to nurture the conditions which secure the
best hope of attainment of that end.").
89. Id at 216 (majority opinion); see also id at 306 (Goldberg, concurring);
Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 94-95 (1985) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
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behavior simply because it is religious in nature.90 Both of these
provisions, originally binding only on the federal government, now bind
state governments as well by operation of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The Establishment Clause
The Establishment Clause acts to prevent the spheres of civil
government and religion from exerting improper influence on each other.
The effect of this clause was famously referred to by Thomas Jefferson
as erecting "'a wall of separation between church and State."' 91 The
metaphor of a wall suggests symmetry-the barrier that keeps religion
from unduly interfering with the state likewise keeps the state from
meddling in religious matters.
Professor Michael McConnell has defined an establishment as
"the promotion and inculcation of a common set of beliefs through
governmental authority."92 At this point in time, "[m]odern constitutional
doctrine stresses the 'advancement of religion' as the key element of
establishment." 93 Historically, however, religious groups experienced a
great deal of government control, largely through the legislation of
religious doctrine and the government's power to appoint religious
leaders.9 4
Thus, a significant purpose of the Establishment Clause is to
protect religious groups from the overreaching of the state. In various
ways, the Establishment Clause protects both minorities and majorities.
90. Emp't Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 877 (1990) (citing Sherbert v. Verner,
374 U.S. 398, 402 (1963)) (holding that government may not regulate religious
beliefs); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 304 (1940) ("A state may not
wholly deny the right to . . . disseminate religious views."); Church of the Lukumi
Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 533 (1993) ("[I]f the object of a
law is to infringe upon or restrict practices because of their religious motivation, the
law is not neutral and it is invalid unless it is justified by a compelling interest and is
narrowly tailored to advance that interest.").
91. Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947) (quoting Reynolds v.
United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878)).
92. Michael W. McConnell, Establishment and Disestablishment at the
Founding, Part I: Establishment of Religion, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2105, 2131
(2003).
93. Id.
94. Id. at 2132.
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It protects minority religions from state interference, which could arise
where a religious (or secular) majority uses the democratic process to
punish a minority. And it protects all religions, popular or unpopular,
from state encroachment into purely religious matters.
The Supreme Court has explained that even laws that do not
"establish" a state religion may offend the First Amendment by "being a
step that could lead to such establishment." 95 Three factors, advanced in
what is commonly known as the Lemon test, have been used to determine
whether a law passes muster under the Establishment Clause. 9 6 "'First, the
statute must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or
primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion;
finally, the statute must not foster 'an excessive government
entanglement with religion."'97
In Larson v. Valente," the Supreme Court drew a further
distinction between laws benefitting all religions in general, and laws
that create distinctions among religions. Larson sets forth a simplified
strict scrutiny test for the latter class of laws: "[W]hen we are presented
with a state law granting a denominational preference, our precedents
demand that we treat the law as suspect and that we apply strict scrutiny
in adjudging its constitutionality." 99 The Court further explained that the
Lemon test is "intended to apply to laws affording a uniform benefit to
95. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971).
96. More recent Establishment Clause cases have used other related tests,
including the Endorsement Test (a test comprising the "primary effect" and "secular
legislative purpose" prongs, but excluding the "excessive government entanglement"
prong, of the Lemon test), id, and the Coercion Test (which proscribes "an attempt
to employ the machinery of the State to enforce a religious orthodoxy"), Lee v.
Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 592 (1992). Asma T. Uddin points out that "the concern
motivating each [of the tests] is whether a given government act has the purpose
and/or effect of favoring or disfavoring religion." Asma T. Uddin, Evolution Toward
Neutrality: Evolution Disclaimers, Establishment Jurisprudence Confusions, and a
Proposal of Untainted Fruits of a Poisonous Tree, 8 RUTGERS J. L. & RELIGION 12
(2007).
97. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-13 (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664,
674 (1970)) (internal citations omitted).
98. 456 U.S. 228 (1982).
99. Id at 246.
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all religions, and not to provisions . . . that discriminate among
religions." 00
The Free Exercise Clause
The Free Exercise Clause also protects important rights of
members of religious groups. While free exercise protections protect
individuals, they also operate on the basis of the association of the
individual with a religious group. As one commentator has maintained:
[T]he right to the free exercise of religion is held
by individuals rather than groups, just as particular
people assert violations of their equal protection
rights. In bringing free exercise claims, however,
just as in pursuing equal protection ones, the
challenger is obliged to describe the collectivity to
which she belongs, persuasively alleging its
religious character and the nature of the
accompanying religious beliefs. Whether or not the
Court considers this religious group as the
backdrop for an individual's claim may make the
difference in whether it accepts the validity of her
. 101
free exercise argument.
Thus, in challenging a law on the basis of the Free Exercise Clause, it is
important to show that the improper burden imposed by the law is related
to the religious status of the challenger.
The Free Exercise Clause provides different levels of protection
to different religious rights. It provides absolute protection from
governmental regulation of religious beliefs.102 "The free exercise of
religion means, first and foremost, the right to believe and profess
whatever religious doctrine one desires. Thus, the First Amendment
100. Id. at 252.
101. Bernadette Meyler, The Equal Protection of Free Exercise: Two
Approaches and their History, 47 B.C. L. REv. 275, 285 (2006).
102. "The free exercise of religion means, first and foremost, the right to
believe and profess whatever religious doctrine one desires. Thus, the First
Amendment obviously excludes all 'governmental regulation of religious beliefs as
such."' Emp't Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 877 (1990) (quoting Sherbert v. Verner,
374 U.S. 398, 402 (1963)).
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obviously excludes all 'governmental regulation of religious beliefs as
such.,,,03 The right to advocate religious beliefs, while not absolute, is
also strongly protected, in much the same way as speech in general is
protected. As the United States Supreme Court has underscored:
No one would contest the proposition that a state
may not, by statute, wholly deny the right to preach
or to disseminate religious views. Plainly such a
previous and absolute restraint would violate the
terms of the guarantee. It is equally clear that a
state may by general and non-discriminatory
legislation regulate the times, the places, and the
manner of soliciting upon its streets, and of holding
meetings thereon .... .
While the right to believe as one chooses and to seek to persuade others
of one's beliefs are important religious rights, the greatest tension arises
in the question of the extent to which religiously motivated actions are
protected from government intrusion. One way the government may seek
to reconcile its general laws with the religious convictions of its citizens
is through the provision of religious exemptions to certain legal
requirements.os As discussed below, the Free Exercise Clause provides
certain guidance regarding. the protection of religiously motivated
actions.
At one extreme, the Supreme Court has made it clear that the
Free Exercise Clause does not give religiously motivated individuals
carte blanche to break the law.106 "[T]he right of free exercise does not
relieve an individual of the obligation to comply with a 'valid and neutral
law of general applicability on the ground that the law proscribes (or
prescribes) conduct that his religion prescribes (or proscribes).',,1
0 7
However, it does protect individuals from government discrimination on
the basis of religion by allowing for religious exemptions provided on an
103. Id.
104. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 304 (1940).
105. See REV. CODE WASH. § 28A.210.090(l)(b) (2011) (providing an
example of a religious exemption to a state law requiring school children to receive a
certain immunization).
106. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 879.
107. Id (quoting United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 n.3 (1982) (Stevens,
J., concurring in judgment)).
382 [Vol. 10
individualized basis, "in circumstances in which individualized
exemptions from a general requirement are available, the government
'may not refuse to extend that system to cases of 'religious hardship'
without compelling reason."" 08
Further, in determining whose interests are sufficient to warrant
a departure from a common legal scheme, "when the government makes
a value judgment in favor of secular motivations, but not religious
motivations, the government's actions must survive heightened
scrutiny."10 9 "[I]f the object of a law is to infringe upon or restrict
practices because of their religious motivation, the law is not neutral and
it is invalid unless it is justified by a compelling interest and is narrowly
tailored to advance that interest."',o Notably, one significant
interpretation of the First Amendment that has been advanced gives a
higher level of protection to individual behavior motivated by religious
belief."' This interpretation would demand strict scrutiny of any law
.112
burdening religious practice.
Thematically, the Free Exercise Clause evidences recognition by
the state that, to the extent that government allows citizens discretion in
108. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520,
537 (1993) (quoting Smith, 494 U.S. at 884).
109. Fraternal Order of Police Newark Lodge No. 12 v. City of Newark, 170
F.3d 359, 366 (3rd Cir. 1999). The Third Circuit stated its assumption "that an
intermediate level of scrutiny applies since this case arose in the public employment
context and since the Department's actions cannot survive even that level of
scrutiny." Id. at 366 n.7.
110. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, 508 U.S. at 533 (internal citations
omitted).
111. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 891-907 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
112. Id. at 903 ("The compelling interest test reflects the First Amendment's
mandate of preserving religious liberty to the fullest extent possible in a pluralistic
society."). In 1993, Congress passed the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42
U.S.C. § 2000bb-1 (1994). The Act restores the pre-Smith strict scrutiny standard,
stating, inter alia, "Government shall not substantially burden a person's exercise of
religion even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability, except [where
the government can demonstrate that the law passes strict scrutiny]." 42 U.S.C. §
2000bb-l(a). In the case of City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997), the
Supreme Court declared the Act unconstitutional as against the states (but not the
federal government). However, several states have since enacted their own versions
of the Act. See Eugene Volokh, Symposium: Intermediate Questions of Religious
Exemptions - A Research Agenda with Test Suites, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 595, 662 n.2
(1999).
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ordering their lives, and absent a compelling government interest to the
contrary, such individual ordering should be allowed by the state and
done according to one's own religious beliefs.
The Religious Question Doctrine
The First Amendment can be thought of as recognizing two
distinct "spheres" in which the separate demands of government and
religion operate. "[T]he First Amendment rests upon the premise that
both religion and government can best work to achieve their lofty aims if
each is left free from the other within its respective sphere."" 3 There are,
however, limits to this separation. At one end of the spectrum, "courts
routinely undertake extensive fact-finding into the content of religious
doctrines and practices in determining whether a practice or doctrine is
'religious' and therefore subject to the protections of the Religion
Clauses and statutes addressing religion.""14 Professor Jared Goldstein
points out that "[fjactual inquiry into the meaning and content of
religious doctrines and practices thus cannot plausibly be prohibited as
long as courts are called upon to construe and apply the Religion Clauses
and myriads of statutes giving special treatment to religion.""' At the
other extreme, courts may not decide the validity of religious truth.116 For
example, United States v. Ballard involved charges of mail fraud against
Guy Ballard, the founder of the "I Am" movement.' 17 The indictment
stated that members of the I Am movement mailed literature claiming
that Ballard had supernatural abilities allowing him, among other things,
to heal the sick."g According to the indictment, the followers knew these
claims to be false and made them only to swindle people of their
money.' The court of appeals stated that the defendants could be found
113. Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 212 (1948).
114. Jared A. Goldstein, Is There A "Religious Question" Doctrine? Judicial
Authority to Examine Religious Practices and Beliefs, 54 CATH. U. L. REv. 497, 538
(2005).
115. Id. at 528.
116. See United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78 (1944).
117. Id. at 79.
118. Id. at 79-80.
119. Id. at 80.
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guilty only if a jury determined that the claims were false.120 The
Supreme Court, however, disagreed, stating that the Religion Clauses
prohibited any inquiry into the truth or falsity of religious beliefs. 121In a
dissent, Chief Justice Stone wrote that defendants could be found guilty
only if it was found that they did not sincerely believe their religious
beliefs. 122
The intermediate case of the competence of a court to adjudicate
the content of a religious doctrine is more complex. Early on, the
Supreme Court stated that "[ilt is not to be supposed that the judges of
the civil courts can be as competent in the ecclesiastical law and religious
faith of all these bodies as the ablest men in each are in reference to their
own."1 23
More recently a class of cases has arisen in which courts have
been asked to decide between competing views of orthodoxy. When a
local church and its denomination disagree over matters of doctrine, a
local church will sometimes break away from its denomination.124 Such a
withdrawal can produce a property dispute between the local church and
the denomination.125 A Georgia case that came before the United States
Supreme Court involved such an instance.126
In Presbyterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial
Presbyterian Church, the dispute went to the jury on the theory that
"Georgia law implies a trust of local church property for the benefit of
the general church on the sole condition that the general church adhere to
its tenets of faith and practice existing at the time of affiliation by the
local churches."1 27 Thus the jury was required to decide "whether the
actions of the general church 'amount to a fundamental or substantial
abandonment of the original tenets and doctrines of the [general church],
so that the new tenets and doctrines are utterly variant from the purposes
120. Id. at 83.
121. Id. at 88.
122. Id. at 89-90 (Stone, C.J., dissenting).
123. Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. 679, 729 (1871).
124. See Presbyterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem'l Presbyterian
Church, 393 U.S. 440, 442-43 (1969).
125. Id.
126. See Blue Hull Mem'l, 393 U.S. 440 (1969).
127. Id. at 443.
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for which the [general church] was founded.'l28 Though the jury found
for the local churches,129 the Supreme Court held that the First
Amendment allows "the civil courts no role in determining ecclesiastical
questions in the process of resolving property disputes.",30 Civil courts
cannot "determine matters at the very core of a religion-the
interpretation of particular church doctrines and the importance of those
doctrines to the religion."' 3'
What allows the court to look into the content of a religion in the
context of assessing a free exercise claim on the one hand, but prohibits
it from deciding a property dispute on the other hand? Professor Kent
Greenawalt argues that the difference is in the selection among
competing religious claims. Greenawalt maintains:
Were the courts to delve into religious doctrines to
resolve intrachurch property disputes, they would
be choosing the understanding of one group of
sincere worshippers over the understanding of
another such group. These disputes arise just
because practitioners understand the requisites of
their faith in sharply opposed ways. To decide in
favor of one side promotes the exercise of religion
of that side at the expense of the exercise of
religion of the other side. By contrast, if the courts
make some inquiry into the content of the religious
belief of an individual who seeks an exemption
from some standard requirement (say, to be willing
to work on Saturday in order to receive
unemployment compensation), it may fail to keep
its hands off; but it does something that is
necessary to facilitate certain forms of free
exercise, it does not need to resolve any competing
religious claims, and it does not frustrate the
128. Id. at 443-44 (reviewing jury instructions).
129. Id. at 444.
130. Id. at 447.
131. Id. at 450.
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religious exercise of one of two competing
132
groups.
This analysis makes sense in light of the conceptualization of free
exercise rights as individual rights enjoyed on the basis of membership in
a religious group. The court needs to test the claim of the individual
against the backdrop of the group, but may not prefer the understanding
of one group to that of another.
However, Professor Goldstein has argued that a court should be
free to examine the existence and content of doctrines in a manner that
does not pass judgment on the actual truth of those doctrines.' 33 As
Goldstein states:
[Jludicial examination of positive questions about
religion is not akin to judicial examination of
normative religious questions. To describe is not to
judge, and the determination of what beliefs people
hold does not require a determination of whether
those beliefs are correct. Judicial examination of
the content of religious doctrine is more akin to
judicial determinations of the content of foreign
law: when a court determines what the law of
England or Italy is, it does not judge the validity of
those countries' laws or endorse the policies behind
those laws. Courts are just as capable of
determining what Judaism or Hinduism have to say
as they are at determining what the laws of Israel or
.134
India are.
The question of what religious determinations a court may make presents
a challenge. As the Supreme Court indicated, religious experts are
presumably more competent in religious questions than civil judges. 35
Goldstein, however, argues that judges are intellectually as competent to
132. Kent Greenawalt, Hands Off When and About What, 84 NOTRE DAME L.
REv. 913, 913-14(2009).
133. See Goldstein, supra note 114, at 538.
134. Id.
135. See Blue Hull Mem'l, 393 U.S. at 447.
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ascertain the content of religious doctrine as they are any other kind of
law. 136
Questions of competence aside, however, the very intrusion of
civil authorities into matters of religious doctrine can lead to an
imposition of one interpretation or version of the religion on members of
the faith who may disagree with that interpretation.'37 As such, while
courts routinely make certain basic determinations regarding the
religious status of doctrines, courts are hesitant to settle disputes internal
to a religion.
Awad v. Ziriax: The Lawsuit Challenging Oklahoma's "Save Our State
Amendment"
On Tuesday, November 2, 2010, Oklahoma held its statewide
general election.'38 State Question 755, the ballot initiative presenting the
"Save Our State Amendment," passed by a wide margin. 139 On Thursday,
November 4, Mr. Muneer Awad, the executive director of the Oklahoma
chapter of the Council on American Islamic Relations, and an Oklahoma
City resident, filed suit against members of the State Board of Elections
to prevent them from certifying the election results for that question. 140
On November 22, Oklahoma attorney Michael Salem entered his
136. Goldstein, supra note 114, at 538.
137. Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Emp't Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 717-18
(1981). Stating:
Where the state conditions receipt of an important benefit upon
conduct proscribed by a religious faith, or where it denies such
a benefit because of conduct mandated by religious belief,
thereby putting substantial pressure on an adherent to modify
his behavior and to violate his beliefs, a burden upon religion
exists. While the compulsion may be indirect, the infringement
upon free exercise is nonetheless substantial.
Id
138. OKLA. STATE ELECTION BD.,supra note 84.
139. Id.
140. Complaint Seeking a Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary
Injunction at 1-4, Awad v. Ziriax, 754 F. Supp.2d 1298 (W.D. Okla. 2010) (No.
CIV-10-1186-M), aff'd, No. 10-6273, 2012 WL 50636 (10th Cir. Jan. 10, 2012).
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appearance for Mr. Awad, as a cooperating attorney for the American
Civil Liberties Union Foundation of Oklahoma.141
On November 29, Judge Vicki Miles-LaGrange granted Mr.
Awad's request for a preliminary injunction.142 Thereafter, Defendants
appealed to the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals.143 In the appeal, Salem,
as well as Daniel Mach and Heather Weaver of the American Civil
Liberties Union, represented Awad.'44
In his case against the Save Our State Amendment ("SOS
Amendment"), Mr. Awad argued that the SOS Amendment violates his
rights under both the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise
Clause.14 5
1. The Establishment Clause Claim: The Amendment Sends an Official
State Message of Disfavor for Mr. Awad's Faith
As stated above, the SOS Amendment provides that Oklahoma
courts "shall not consider international law or Sharia Law," and that the
courts may not look to the laws of other states if those laws "include
Sharia Law."l46 The State Question described Sharia Law in definite
religious terms, as "Islamic Law," based on "the Koran and the teaching
of Mohammed." 4 7 Thus, Sharia Law is the only particular body of law
specifically proscribed by the amendment.
Awad argued that the SOS Amendment labels him as a political
and social outsider because of his Islamic practice and belief;
characterizes his Islamic religious beliefs as a threat from which
Oklahoma must be saved; and conveys "the unmistakable message that
[his Muslim] faith is officially disfavored by the State generally, and the
judicial system, in particular." 4 8 As such, Awad argued, the State has
141. Entry of Appearance at 1, Awad, 754 F. Supp.2d 1298 (No. CIV-10-
1186-M).
142. Awad, 754 F. Supp.2d at 1299.
143. Awad, 2012 WL 50636, at *3.
144. See Brief for Plaintiff, at 1, Awad, 2012 WL 50636 (No. 10-6273).
145. See id.
146. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
147. See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
148. Brief for Plaintiff, supra note 144, at 44.
2012]1 389
made an official choice of a religion to treat with special disfavor. 149
Since the Establishment Clause prohibits the state from favoring any
particular religion, it follows logically that the state may not disfavor a
particular religion.
2. The Free Exercise Clause Claim: The Amendment Makes Mr. Awad
Uniquely Unable to Draft a Reliable Will Without "Scrubbing" It of
Religious Terms
Awad's last will and testament provides for certain charitable
allotments to be made "in a manner that does not exceed the proscribed
limitations found in Sahih Bukhari, Volume 4, Book 51, Number 7.,,lso
Sahih Bukhari is a highly respected collection of the "sayings and deeds
of Prophet Muhammed,"' 5 ' and the cited provision appears to set a cap
on the amount of property that a decedent may give to charity by will.152
It also provides for the preparation of Awad's body in a manner that
"comports precisely with the hadith enumerated in Sahih Bukhari,
Volume 2, Book 23, Number 345, " and for "a burial plot that allows
my body to be interned [sic] with my head pointed in the direction of
Mecca." 54 These deeply significant instructions flow from "what [the
SOS Amendment] defines as Sharia law.",5 5
Awad argued that the SOS Amendment interferes with the
156
operation of his last will and testament. Because his will "refers to and
incorporates his Islamic religious beliefs," the amendment "will render
those will provisions unenforceable."1 57 Even though it is not possible to
know, before his will is probated, how a court will handle the portions of
149. Id
150. Id at 70 (Attachment 2, Redacted Last Will and Testament of Muneer
Awad).
151. See SAHIH-BUKHARI, http://www.sahih-bukhari.com/ (last visited Jan. 31,
2012).
152. See Wills and Testaments (Wasaayaa), ISLAMICITY.COM,
http://www.islamicity.com/mosque/sunnah/bukhari/051.sbt.html (last visited Jan. 3 1,
2012).
153. Brief for Plaintiff, supra note 144, at 69.
154. Id. at 69-70.
155. Id at 12.
156. Id at 22.
157. Id.
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the will that incorporate these religious beliefs, the presence of the
amendment creates a "cloud of uncertainty over the will's full
enforceability because of its religious references."'
58
As such, Awad argued, the SOS Amendment "imposes a special
disability on Mr. Awad and other Muslims seeking relief in the state
courts in a variety of contexts. While citizens of other faiths need not
scrub religious expression and terms from their legal documents to
protect their enforceability, Muslims must."" 9 This disability represents
a burden placed on Awad by the state, in contravention of the Free
Exercise Clause, simply because of the particular religious nature of his
activities.
First Amendment Analysis ofBallot Measures: Additional
Considerations
The First Amendment analysis of Oklahoma's anti-Sharia
initiative raises a few issues unique to voter-approved ballot measures.
Unlike anti-Sharia bills proposed and passed by the legislature, the intent
behind ballot measures is more difficult to ascertain, as it is thousands of
voters who are ultimately responsible for enacting a ballot referendum.
As a general rule, voter animus is difficult to prove and the law
discourages any such probing. As the Ninth Circuit has noted in such
cases, "[i]f the true motive is to be ascertained not through speculation
but through a probing of the private attitudes of the voters, the inquiry
would entail an intolerable invasion of the privacy that must protect an
exercise of the franchise."1 60
There are, however, cases where the legislative intent behind
ballot referendums can be appropriately assessed. 16 Southern Almedal62
is distinguishable from Reitman v. Mulkey, where the Supreme Court
held that inquiry into voter intent is permissible if a state law
significantly encourages and involves the state in private
158. Id. at 23.
159. Id. at 32.
160. Southern Alameda Spanish Speaking Org. v. City of Union City, Cal.,
424 F.2d 291, 295 (9th Cir. 1970) (citing Spaulding v. Blair, 403 F.2d 862 (4th Cir.
1968)).
161. See generally id.
162. 387 U.S. 369 (1967).
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discrimination.',163 Beyond voters, the Supreme Court in City of
Cuyahoga Falls, Ohio v. Buckeye Community Hope Foundation'6
clarified that "statements made by decision-makers or referendum
sponsors during deliberation over a referendum may constitute relevant
evidence of discriminatory intent in a challenge to an ultimately enacted
initiative."l65 The Oklahoma anti-Sharia initiative is an enacted
referendum, and it is thus entirely appropriate to inquire into the intent of
referendum sponsors.
Moreover, as described above, a law is subject to attack under
the Establishment Clause not only if it fails to have a secular purpose, but
also if its primary effect is to advance or inhibit religion. 166 And, if the
law encourages excessive entanglement between the state and religion, it
is equally open to attack.167 As such, regardless of whether legislative
animus can be proven, the Oklahoma measure remains vulnerable to
First Amendment critique if it fails to satisfy the remaining two prongs of
the Lemon test. 168
Threshold Inquiries: Standing, Ripeness, and Irreparable Harm
Some of the primary issues on appeal to the 10th Circuit were
whether Awad had standing to bring his First Amendment claims, 169
whether his claims were ripe for adjudication, 17 0 and whether the harms
he claims were irreparable.
163. See City of Union City, 424 F. 2d at 295 (discussing Reitman v. Mulkey,
387 U.S. 369 (1967)).
164. 538 U.S. 188 (2003).
165. Id. at 196-97 (emphasis added).
166. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971).
167. Id. at 612-13.
168. Id.
169. See Reply Brief of Defendants/Apellants at 12, Awad v. Zinax, No. 10-
6273, 2012 WL 50636 (10th Cir. Jan. 10, 2012).
170. Id at 2.
171. Id at 9-10.
1. The District Court Holding
In considering his request for a temporary restraining order on
the certification of the election results, the Western District of Oklahoma
found that Awad satisfied the three requirements necessary to
demonstrate standing: (1) the party suffers from an "injury in fact,"
which is a "concrete and particularized," not hypothetical; (2) a party's
injury is "traceable to the challenged action" of the defendant before the
court; and (3) "that injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable
decision." 7 2 In applying the first factor, the District Court found that Mr.
Awad will suffer an injury in fact, namely a violation of his First
Amendment freedoms.173 The court reasoned that, by singling out
Muslims and Sharia law, Awad would be stigmatized in the political
community because of the specific condemnation of his religion. 74 The
court also held that the law would have a chilling effect on Awad's
practice of his religion,175 and that he would suffer a particular injury
when his last will and testament would be unenforceable under the
Amendment. 176
On the question of whether Awad's claims were ripe for
adjudication, the court found in favor of Awad. It noted that, for a
claim to be justiciable under Article III, the question of ripeness must not
focus on "'whether the plaintiff was in fact harmed, but rather whether
the harm asserted [by the plaintiff] has matured sufficiently to warrant
judicial intervention."s 78 Moreover, a court should consider whether or
not a case involves assertions that are contingent or "'may not occur at
all,"' while deeming those that will likely or most definitely occur as ripe
for consideration.' 79 In so considering, the court expressed unequivocal
172. Awadv. Ziriax, 754 F. Supp.2d 1298, 1302 (W.D. Okla. 2010), affd, No.
10-6273, 2012 WL 50636 (10th Cir. Jan. 10, 2012) (quoting Hydro Res., Inc. v. U.S.
Envtl. Prot. Agency, 608 F.3d 1131, 1144 (10th Cir. 2010)).
173. Id. at 1303.
174. Id. at 1303-04.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 1304.
177. Id.
178. Id. (quoting Kan. Judicial Review v. Stout, 519 F.3d 1107, 1116 (10th
Cir. 2008)).
179. Id. (quoting Initiative and Referendum Inst. v. Walker, 450 F.3d 1082,
1097 (10th Cir. 2006)).
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support for Awad, finding that he clearly satisfied the ripeness test; it
stated that the "plaintiffs alleged injury does not depend on any
uncertain, contingent future events; all that is remaining is the ministerial
task of defendants certifying the election results."'s Furthermore, the
court points out that there is "no need . . . to wait for . . . Oklahoma
court[s] to interpret said Amendment"; the Plaintiff is only asserting a
facial challenge, and so only a facial reading of the Amendment is
181necessary.
The court also ruled that Awad would suffer irreparable harm to
his First Amendment rights as a result of the enactment of the anti-Sharia
bill; according to the court, as a rule, "'[t]he loss of First Amendment
freedoms, for even minimal periods of time, unquestionably constitutes
irreparable injury."" 82 In addressing the Defendant's claim that the harm
to voters in delaying their will outweighed the harm suffered by Awad,
the court emphasized the rights enshrined in the Bill of Rights, noting
that individual rights cannot be taken away by the will of the majority.
The court also stressed that the anti-Sharia bill was enacted as a
"preventative measure" to disable Sharia law from being applied in
Oklahoma courts.184 In other words, Oklahoma voters were not
addressing a current problem; when questioned by judges, Defendants'
could not confirm that Oklahoma courts had ever applied Sharia law. The
court held that the harm to Awad outweighed the majority's right to vote
on an issue that was not even a current threat to Oklahomans.'
2. Tenth Circuit Appeall86
In their briefing at the appellate level, Defendants countered each
of the above holdings by the District Court.'8 They argued that a
180. Id. at 1305.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 1307 (quoting Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373 (1976)).
183. Id. at 1308.
184. Id.
185. See id.
186. This article was written before the 10th Circuit issued its decision
affirming the District Court on January 10, 2012. See Awad v. Ziriax, 2012 WL
50636 (10th Cir. Jan. 10, 2012).
187. See generally Reply Brief of Defendants/Appellants, supra note 169.
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conjectural or hypothetical injury is not enough for a plaintiff to assert a
claim; Article III requires that a plaintiff must suffer an "injury in
fact." An "injury in fact" is "'an invasion of a legally protected interest
that is (a) concrete and particularized and (b) actual or imminent, i.e., not
conjectural or hypothetical." 1 8 9 In other words, to show standing, a
plaintiff must suffer a "present or imminent injury, as opposed to a mere
possibility, or even probability of future injury."
1 90
Standing is determined as of the date the complaint is originally
filed, in this case, November 4, 2010.'91 Defendants argued that, as of
this date, Awad had not suffered an immediate injury.192 Rather, Awad's
claim that the anti-Sharia amendment condemned his religion was,
according to Defendants, merely a personal opinion and did not establish
imminent injury.193
The District Court found that Mr. Awad had standing because
the anti-Sharia amendment conveyed "an official government message of
disapproval and hostility toward [Awad's] religious beliefs . . . forcing
him to curtail his political and religious activities., 194 Defendants argued
that feelings of offense and alienation do not constitute injuries in fact,
and thus cannot confer standing.' 9 5 Furthermore, on Awad's
Establishment claim, Defendants contend that, until Oklahoma courts
interpret the amendment, any assertion that it leads to excessive
entanglement between religion and state is mere speculation.196
Defendants also argued that Awad's claim was not ripe for
judicial consideration.1 97 To determine ripeness, a court should look to
(1) "the fitness of the issues for judicial decision"; and (2) any "hardship
188. See id. at 12-13.
189. Opening Brief of Defendants/Appellants at 12, Awad v. Zinax, 2012 WL
50636 (No. 10-6273) (citing Essence, Inc. v. City of Fed. Heights, 285 F.3d 1272,
1280 (10th Cir. 2002)).
190. Id. (quoting Rector v. City & Cnty. Of Denver, 348 F.3d 935, 942-43
(10th Cir. 2003)).
191. See id at 14.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Awad v. Ziriax, 754 F.Supp. 2d 1298, 1303 (W.D. Okla. 2010), aff'd,
2012 WL 50636 (No. 10-6273).
195. Reply Brief of Defendants/Appellants, supra note 169, at, 8-9.
196. Id. at 2, 11-12.
197. See id. at 2.
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[imposed on the parties by] withholding court consideration."'
Defendants pointed out that courts are very careful to abide by these
factors, especially when the electorate has voted on a proposition and
there is no showing of direct harm. 9 Defendants cited Diaz v. Board of
County Commissioners ofDade County,200 which emphasized that, where
a proposition is passed by voters and is then challenged for its
constitutional validity, it is imperative that it is first interpreted as
constitutionally repugnant before a court halts the people's right to enact
ordinances.20 The case should otherwise be deemed unripe for judicial
202
consideration and a preliminary injunction should not be granted.
Defendants asserted that Awad and the District Court speculated as to the
judicial interpretation of the anti-Sharia bill, construing its meaning in
203
only one way, that is, as a limitation on the practice of Islam.
Defendant argued that this was neither the meaning nor the intent of the
law, and that Oklahoma courts could feasibly interpret the bill in a
manner that would not violate any citizen's First Amendment
204
freedoms.
Finally, Defendants maintained that Awad failed to make a
showing that he would suffer irreparable harm by virtue of the bill being
205
enacted into law. Defendants agreed with the District Court that,
"'[t]he loss of First Amendment freedoms, for even minimal periods of
time, unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury."' 2 06 However, they
argued that the court failed to find that the plaintiff would suffer a clear
and definite injury, aside from the bill's potential to "villainize and
demonize the Muslim community of Oklahoma." 20 7 Defendants argued
that such demonization does not amount to an injury because "[m]ere
198. Opening Brief of Defendants/Appellants, supra note 189, at 15 (quoting
Weber v. Lockyer, 365 F. Supp. 2d 1119, 1124 (N.D. Cal. 2005)).
199. See id.
200. 502 F. Supp. 190 (S.D. Fla. 1980).
201. See id. at 194.
202. See id.
203. See Reply Brief of Defendants/Appellants, supra note 169, at 7-9.
204. Id. at 9-10.
205. See Opening Brief of Defendants/Appellants, supra note 189, at 12-14.
206. Id. (quoting Elrod v. Bums, 472 U.S. 347, 373 (1976)).
207. Id.
396 FIRST A MENDMENT LA W RE VIE W [Vol. 10
ANTI-SHARIA INITIATIVES
personal offense to governmental action does not give rise to standing to
sue." 208
Defendants also disagreed with the District Court that Awad's
injury outweighed the injury suffered by the voters, whose will was
subverted by the ruling in favor of Awad.209 The fundamental right of
citizens to vote for particular propositions should be overruled only by a
showing of clear and direct harm to protected freedoms.
In his reply, Awad reiterated his initial positions.210 On the issue
of standing, he asserted that the anti-Sharia bill, once enacted, would
prevent him from executing his last will and testament;211 he argued that
the only way reasonable application of the Amendment would be one
that prevented the probating of wills that incorporate "elements of the
Islamic prophetic traditions." 2 12 Under the amendment, Awad argued, he
would be forced to either rewrite his will, or be left with a cloud of doubt
over whether or not his last will and testament will be upheld according
to the dictates of his faith. 21 More broadly, he emphasized that the
amendment violated the core Establishment Clause principle of official
neutrality among religions because it singled out Sharia law as the only
214
enumerated prohibited religious law.
Awad further argued that his claim was ripe for the same reasons
that he had standing to bring suit:2 15 the bill, once enacted into law,
would render his last will and testament void, or at the very least cast
serious doubt on its enforceability.216 Because this harm was enough to
create a case or controversy, it was ripe for adjudication.2 17
Finally, he contended that there existed a clear and direct harm to
him, because the amendment was detailed in the absolute prohibition of
any reference to Sharia law in the state of Oklahoma; state courts are
208. Id. at 18-19.
209. See Reply Brief of Defendants/Appellants, supra note 169, at 12-14.
210. See generally Plaintiff-Appellee Awad's Response Brief, Awad v. Ziriax,
No. 10-6273, 2012 WL 50636 (10th Cir. Jan. 10, 2012).
211. Id. at 22.
212. Id. at 22-23.
213. Id. at 23.
214. Id.
215. Id. at 27.
216. Id. at 27-28.
217. Id. at 27.
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prohibited from looking to, considering, or using Sharia law for any
purpose.218 Awad would be forced to rewrite his will, "eliminating all
religious expression and Islamic references"-a burden that the Jewish
or Christian citizens of Oklahoma would not similarly face. 2 19 He added
that the harm left "Muslims without judicial recourse unless they can
closet their faith by devising a way to assert free exercise rights without
reference to their religion." 2 20 This, he argued, violates the Free Exercise
221
Clause and presents a harm addressable by a court of law.
The Tenth Circuit heard oral arguments in the case on September
13, 2011, and has not yet issued its opinion.22 During arguments, the
judges focused on one primary question to the Defendants: does this law
not single out Muslims and disfavor Islam as a religion?223 Defendants
argued that it would not because the law was not intended to be
discriminatory and seeks to address only those portions of Sharia that
224
would trump U.S. law.
On October 12, 2011, the Tenth Circuit issued an order
requesting parties to submit supplemental briefing on two issues:
1. Should the test set forth in Larson v. Valente,
456 U.S. 228 (1982), govern the Establishment
Clause issue in this case? See also Hernandez v.
Commissioner, 490 U.S. 680 (1989); Colorado
Christian University v. Weaver, 534 F.3d 1245
(10th Cir. 2008). Why or why not?
2. How should the Establishment Clause issue be
analyzed and decided under the Larson test,
assuming it does apply?225
218. Id. at 31.
219. Id.
220. Id. at 32.
221. Id.
222. See supra note 186.
223. John Ingold, Denver's 10th Circuit Court in Spotlight as it Considers
Oklahoma's Shariah-law Case, DENVER POST, Sept. 13, 2011 at B2, available at
http://www.denverpost.com/news/ci 18881457.
224. Id.
225. See Order, Awad v. Ziriax, No. 10-6723, 2012 WL 50636 (10th Cir. Jan.,
2012).
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The parties filed briefs on November 2, 2011. Defendants argued that the
Larson test226 is inapplicable because "[a] 'denominational preference'
exists only when a law's primary effect is to intentionally discriminate
among religions," 2 27 and the SOS Amendment's "primary effect is to
regulate Oklahoma judges, not to advance preferred religions at the
expense of others." 2 28 Defendants argued that the 10th Circuit should
apply the Lemon test, but that even if they applied the Larson test, the
SOS Amendment would pass muster,229 because it is "narrowly tailored
to further Oklahoma's compelling interest in regulating what law is
applied in its courts."230
Awad argued that the Larson test does apply, as the SOS
Amendment "imposes precisely the sort of denominational preference
forbidden by Larson."231 Awad argued that the Amendment "facially
targets one religious tradition for disfavored treatment, and therefore
232
triggers strict scrutiny review that it cannot possibly survive."
First Amendment Analysis of the Save Our State ("SOS') Amendment
Assuming Mr. Awad is found to have standing to bring the suit,
the court will evaluate his claims in light of the First Amendment's
Establishment Clause and Free Exercise Clause. Further, in addition to
the specific claims set forth by Awad, the SOS Amendment raises
several other issues requiring First Amendment analysis.
226. "[W]hen we are presented with a state law granting a denominational
preference, our precedents demand that we treat the law as suspect and that we apply
strict scrutiny in adjudging its constitutionality." Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228,
246 (1982).
227. Supplemental Brief of Appellants at 4, Awad, 2012 WL 50636 (No. 10-
6273).
228. Id. at 6.
229. Id. at 9.
230. Id. at 16.
231. Plaintiff-Appellee Awad's Supplemental Brief at 2, 5, Awad, 2012 WL
50636 (No. 10-6273).
232. Id. at I1.
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Awad's Establishment Clause Claim: State Disfavor of Islam
As explained above, Awad's Establishment Clause argument is
that the SOS Amendment sends an official state message of disfavor for
Awad's faith. As discussed below, more important than any claims of
stigmatization is the effect this unique disfavoring has on Muslims
selecting desirable arbitration options and seeking to enforce legal
documents based on Sharia principles.
Moreover, to pass Establishment Clause muster, a law must pass
each prong of the Lemon test.233 First, it "must have a secular legislative
purpose.,234 While the provisions of the SOS Amendment relating to
international law may be entirely motivated by secular considerations, it
is implausible that the repeated references to Sharia law are so motivated.
In defining Sharia law for voters, the ballot language stated simply:
"Sharia Law is Islamic law. It is based on two principal sources, the
Koran and the teaching of Mohammed." 2 35 Indeed, the bill's legislative
sponsor believed the effect of the bill was that it would close a "backdoor
way to get Sharia law into courts" by preventing parties from "say[ing]
we want to be bound by Islamic law and then ask[ing] the courts to
enforce those agreements." 2 36 In fact, dispute resolution based on the
237
principles of a variety of religions is common in the United States.
Seeking to prevent parties from using Islamic principles in particular-
but not those of any other faith-demonstrates a sectarian, not a secular,
238purpose.
233. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971).
234. Id. at 612.
235. See supra note 80.
236. Michael A. Hefland, Op-Ed., A Law We Don't Need, L.A. TIMEs, Nov.
10, 2010, http://articles.latimes.com/2010/nov/i 0/opinion/la-oe-helfand-oklahoma-
20101110.
237. See id. "In reality, such arbitration is well established. For nearly half a
century, Jewish, Christian and Muslim tribunals have operated in the United States
in concert with government courts." Id.
238. In contrast, see Catholic League for Religious and Civil Rights v. City and
County of San Francisco, 624 F.3d 1043 (9th Cir. 2009), where the court held that
the City of San Francisco did not violate the Establishment Clause in passing a non-
binding resolution opposing a Vatican directive that the Catholic archdiocese stop
placing children in need of adoption with homosexual households. See id Although
the resolution on its face opposed a Catholic measure, the court held that the primary
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Awad's Free Exercise Clause Claim: Enforcement of Islamically-Based
Will
Awad's Free Exercise Clause argument is that the amendment
makes Mr. Awad uniquely unable to draft a reliable will without
"scrubbing" it of religious terms. 239 The reason for this is that his will
makes reference to religious instructions contained in sources that, under
the SOS Amendment, would be classified as Sharia law.240 These
instructions involve, among other things, the distribution of Awad's
assets and the preparation and interment of his body. 24 1 The instructions
flow from specific sources within the corpus of Sharia law, and verifying
the proper execution of the instructions could require a court to make a
242basic analysis of the sources.
The Defendants in Awad's case disagree, stating:
The measure is merely a choice of law provision,
applicable to the courts of Oklahoma. It neither
favors nor discriminates against any religion. The
purpose of the resolution was not to express disapproval of Catholic beliefs, instead,
the
'objective observer' who is.. . 'familiar with the history of the
government's actions and competent to learn what history has
to show' would conclude that the defendants acted with a
predominantly secular purpose, i.e., to promote equal rights for
same-sex couples in adoption and to place the greatest number
of children possible with qualified families. Moreover, San
Francisco has a well-known and lengthy history of promoting
gay rights . . . . A reasonable observer would consider the
resolution in the context of both this history and the Catholic
Church's unabashed efforts to frustrate same-sex adoption in
San Francisco, the defendants' political bailiwick. In light of
this context, such an observer would conclude that the primary
purpose behind the resolution was secular-to promote same-
sex adoption.
Id. at 1060-61 (Silverman, J., concurring) (internal citations and quotation marks
omitted). A similarly secular purpose is unavailable in the case of the Oklahoma
State Question 755, and the objective outsider could not conclude otherwise.
239. See Plaintiff-Appellee Awad's Response Brief, supra note 240, at 31.
240. See supra notes 146-59 and accompanying text.
241. Id.
242. Id.
measure bans Oklahoma courts from considering
the laws of other nations and cultures, regardless of
the religious origins of such laws, if any. It is
therefore a neutral law of general applicability and
243
does not raise free exercise concerns.
However, as the lower court pointed out, "the actual language of the
amendment reasonably, and perhaps more reasonably, may be viewed as
specifically singling out Sharia Law (plaintiffs faith) and, thus, is not
facially neutral."244 Indeed, Defendants' argument that the amendment
merely bans consideration of "the laws of other nations and cultures,
regardless of the religious origins of such laws, if any" does not make
sense. 24 5 By its own terms, the SOS Amendment takes aim at exactly two
sources of law, "international law" and "Sharia law." 24 6 Sharia law is
defined, in the language of the ballot initiative, in purely religious
247
terms. Far from being the law of another nation or culture, Sharia
represents the religious convictions of many Americans, including Awad.
Under current First Amendment jurisprudence, "if the object of a
law is to infringe upon or restrict practices because of their religious
motivation," the government will have the last word only in cases where
it can show a compelling interest in its desired purpose and where it
narrowly tailors a legal requirement to that interest.248 And because the
amendment's plain language and legislative history show that the object
of the Sharia provision is to create a restriction based solely upon
religious (Islamic) consideration, the compelling interest/narrowly
tailored test is appropriate to the SOS Amendment.
Significantly, the District Court found that the defendants
"presented no evidence which would show that the amendment is
justified by any compelling interest or is narrowly tailored."249 It would,
of course, be possible for Sharia law, in certain situations, to require
243. Reply Brief of Defendants/Appellants, supra note 169, at 33.
244. Awadv. Ziriax, 754 F. Supp. 2d 1298, 1307 (W.D. Okla. 2010), aff'dNo.
10-6273, 2012 WL 50636 (10th Cir. Jan. 10, 2012).
245. Opening Brief of Defendants/Appellants, supra note 189 at 27-29.
246. See supra note 80.
247. See supra note 80.
248. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520,
533 (1993) (citations omitted).
249. Awad, 754 F.Supp.2d at 1307.
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results that the government has a compelling interest in preventing. A
hypothetical conflict between the laws of Oklahoma and Sharia law
posited by the Defendants gives an example: "if Sharia law so provided,
Mr. Awad could not provide in his will for his wife to receive none of the
property they acquired during their marriage." 2 50 However, even in the
face of a compelling interest, a state may not infringe the Free Exercise
rights of its citizens by a law that is not narrowly tailored to protecting
that interest. 25 1 Considering the wide range of application of Sharia
principles in the lives of Muslims, a blanket ban of all Islamic law is
plainly not narrowly tailored.
To the extent that the enforcement of Awad's will would require
the court to decide a contest between two interpretations of Islam, the
religious question doctrine, described above, already acts to prevent that.
However, where a court simply looks for guidance to clear principles of
law or religion referenced in a will, nothing should prevent the
implementation of Awad's desires. To deny Awad the ability to make
these important decisions with reference to the principles of his religion
flies in the face of the religious freedom the First Amendment
guarantees.
Further Issues Requiring First Amendment Analysis
The SOS Amendment, if implemented, would have a wide range
252
of effects. Awad identified two, discussed above. Beyond these two
effects is a host of other effects that remain to be considered. These
include preventing judges from properly considering factors relevant to
the background of a dispute, limiting judges' ability to craft equitable
remedies, and providing unequal protection for persons who make use of
private Islamic arbitration.
Because of the "wall of separation"253 created by the
Establishment Clause, the only way in which U.S. citizens may become
250. Opening Brief of Defendants/Appellants, supra note 189, at 35.
251. See Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, 508 U.S. at 546 ("To satisfy the
commands of the First Amendment, a law restrictive of religious practice must
advance 'interests of the highest order' and must be narrowly tailored in pursuit of
those interests." (quoting McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 628 (1978))).
252. Brief for Plaintiff, supra note 144, at 32, 44.
253. Everson v. Bd. of Educ. of Ewing Twp., 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1946).
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bound by religious law, or by any non-U.S. law, is by their own choice.
The submitting of parties to private or religious law happens constantly
in our society. Every valid contract entered into by two parties becomes,
as between them, a source of private law. The law embodied in private
contracts is neither federal nor state law-rather, it is a binding
agreement freely entered by the parties. Similarly, when Awad made his
will and incorporated specific provisions motivated by his Islamic faith,
he made a free choice as to the disposition of his assets and the manner
of his burial. That Americans have the freedom to make such choices,
where the choices themselves do not conflict with society's greater
interests, is beyond debate.
The Relevance of Sharia Law to the Background of a Dispute
If two Muslims enter into a contract that requires one to do
something that makes reference to an Islamic concept, a court might need
to examine what each party believed the import of the contract to be.
Examples could include an employment contract under which an
employer agrees to allow an employee to perform daily prayers, to make
a Hajj pilgrimage, or to come to work at a different time on the days of
Ramadan. If the Muslim party seeks to enforce this contract, there may
not be a dispute about the appropriate interpretation of the religious
doctrines implicated. Rather, the dispute may be about whether the two
parties ever formed a meeting of the minds with regard to the contract. In
order to ascertain what was in the mind of the parties, the court might
find it necessary to examine basic Sharia law concepts.
Alternatively, if one party contracted to provide for the other
party to make the Hajj pilgrimage and defaulted on the contract, the court
might order the defaulting party to pay to the other party an amount of
money that would allow him or her to make such a pilgrimage. Such a
calculation would not entail the decision of a religious dispute, but would
require the court to have a basic understanding of what a Hajj pilgrimage
is within the context of Islam. In these cases, in order to understand what
the parties meant to contract for, and to give effect to such a contract,
even in the absence of any dispute as to the religious doctrines or
definitions implicated, the court would need to make minimal findings of
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fact about Sharia principles. Under the Oklahoma law, such findings of
254
fact would be prohibited if, and only if, they relied upon Sharia. By
contrast, if a company violated a contract provision relating to an
employee's non-Sharia-based religious obligation, the amendment, by its
own terms, would not prevent the court from making similar findings
255
regarding the nature of the religious obligation.
With regard to this effect of the legislation, it is not clear that the
legislators or people of Oklahoma intended to disfavor Islam with the
absurd consequences that flow from the amendment. Rather, the
disability imposed on courts to make factual inquiries into basic cultural
ideas underlying Sharia law is likely an unforeseen consequence of the
law. However, this effect does place an unreasonable strain on the
religious liberty values underscored by the Establishment Clause and
Free Exercise Clause by failing to reasonably accommodate the desire of
individuals to order their lives according to their religious beliefs.
The Relevance of Sharia Law to a Judge's Decision-Making Process
A troubling effect of the legislation would be denying the judge
discretion to consider the Sharia-based beliefs of litigants as the judge
crafts equitable remedies or sentences. "Traditionally, equity has been
characterized by a practical flexibility in shaping its remedies and by a
,256
facility for adjusting and reconciling public and private needs." A
denial of consideration of those private needs, simply because they
belong to Muslims, is antithetical to the commitment of the United States
to the protection of its religious citizens.
For example, if a judge seeks to impose community service
hours on a Muslim, or to craft a visitation order in custody dispute
between two Muslims, fairness to the litigants suggests that the
timetables of their needs to perform religious duties be given
consideration. Yet the amendment, by its own terms, seems to disallow
257
even such basic Sharia-based considerations. As in the discussion
254. See supra note 80.
255. H.R. 1056, 52nd Leg., 2nd Reg. Sess. (Okla. 2010), available at
https://www.sos.ok.gov/documents/questions/755.pdf ("[T]he courts shall not
consider .. . Sharia law.").
256. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 300 (1955).
257. Okla. H.R. 1056.
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relating to the judge's need to consider background facts to a dispute, so
too in crafting equitable remedies, a judge may be called upon to
consider the content of a litigant's Sharia law obligations.
Again, it is unlikely that the legislators or people of Oklahoma
intended to disfavor Islam with the absurd consequences that flow from
the amendment. Rather, these burdens were likely unforeseen. As before,
this effect places an unreasonable burden on American religious liberty
values, by failing to reasonably accommodate the desire of individuals to
order their lives according to their religious beliefs.
Unequal Protection of the Courts for Sharia-Based Arbitration Tribunals
As explained above, one of the stated objectives of the SOS
Amendment was to prevent Islamic religious arbitration. 2 In fact, as set
forth below, the amendment would provide a substantially inferior level
of court protection to litigants who use Sharia-based alternative dispute
resolution than to litigants who use alternative dispute resolution options
based in Christian or Jewish religious principles. As such, it would
provide unequal protection of the law, based solely on litigants' choice of
religious principles.
Representative Rex Duncan, then chair of the Oklahoma House
Judiciary Committee and author of the Resolution,259 discussed the
application of Sharia law by foreign courts in a Fox News interview with
Sean Hannity.260 Responding to a question from Hannity about Sharia
law in Great Britain, Duncan replied:
Well, it's not unprecedented, and that's the
problem. People will not open their eyes, or they
choose to look the other way. Sharia law has come
to Great Britain. I've described it as a cancer upon
258. See supra notes 72-85 and accompanying text.
259. Patrick B. McGuigan, State Question 755 Would Ban Use of Foreign
Judicial Fulings, CAPTIAL BEAT OK (Sept. 2, 2010), http://capitolbeatok.com
/_webapp 3337864/State Question 755.would ban use of foreignjudicial rulin
gs.
260. Okiecampaigns, Oklahoma State Rep Rex Duncan Talking About SQ 755,
YouTUBE (June 10, 2010), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v-ummRXdDgFgl.
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Great Britain's survivability. It is that serious.
261There are dozens of Sharia type courts there ....
Duncan went on to describe the British situation as follows:
Well, what it would entail is, say, a domestic case,
a family, a divorce or child custody, arbitration.
These parties would come to the court and say we
want to be bound by Islamic law and then ask the
courts to enforce those agreements. That is a back-
door way to get Sharia law in the courts. Now there
will be efforts, have been some efforts, I believe, to
explore bringing that to America, and it's
dangerous. It would be the same cancer upon
American courts it is in Great Britain.262
The examples Duncan gives are illustrative of the intent of the provision
as it relates to Sharia law. It appears that this provision was intended to
foreclose parties' ability to invoke Sharia law in agreements in a number
of areas. Duncan talks about arbitration and the enforcement of
263agreements, giving specific examples from the family law context.
Duncan's view of the effect of the bill was that it would close a
"back door way to get Sharia law into courts" by preventing parties from
"say[ing] we want to be bound by Islamic law and then ask[ing] the
courts to enforce those agreements." 264 Interpreted in light of this
background, the amendment would operate to delegitimize agreements
made by private parties on the basis of Sharia law principles by refusing
those agreements the protection of court enforceability. It is a current
practice among some American Muslims to use arbitration clauses




264. Helfand, supra note 236.
265. The following example of such an arbitration clause appears in the facts
of the Minnesota Court of Appeals case Abd Alla v. Mourssi:
Any dispute, controversy or claim arising out of or in
connection with or relating to this Agreement or any breach or
alleged breach hereof shall, upon the request of any party
involved, be submitted to and settled by arbitration before the
Arbitration Court of an Islamic Mosque located in the State of
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Examples of disputes submitted to imams at local U.S. mosques include
"family disagreements, inheritance, business disputes, marriage, and
,,266divorce issues. While nothing in the Oklahoma provision prevents
Muslims from contracting with such arbitration provisions, or in fact
from making use of Islamic or Sharia-based dispute resolution, the
provision apparently seeks to prevent courts from taking any action that
requires consideration of the Sharia principles underlying an arbitral
decision.
Two examples show how a court might be called upon to enforce
an agreement in a way that "considers" Sharia law. In the first, two
parties simply write a contract and state that the contract is to be
interpreted in light of Sharia law. When seeking to enforce the contract,
one party sues the other in an Oklahoma court. Both parties agree that the
contract is binding, but present alternative views on their responsibilities
under the contract, based on different views of Sharia law. The court is
forced to examine Sharia law and to decide which of the litigants' views
represents a more valid interpretation of Sharia law. Such a court
decision would certainly necessitate a "consideration" of Sharia law,
which would not be permitted by the Oklahoma provision. 2 67 However,
such a decision might be disallowed already by the religious question
doctrine. If it is, the Oklahoma amendment would be duplicative and
without effect in this area.
Minnesota pursuant to the laws of Islam (or at any other place
or under any other form of arbitration mutually acceptable to
the parties so involved). Any award rendered shall be final and
conclusive upon the parties and a judgment thereon may be
entered in the highest court of the forum, state or Federal,
having jurisdiction. The expenses of the arbitration shall be
borne equally by the parties to the arbitration, provided that
each party shall pay for and bear the costs of its own experts,
evidence, and counsel.
680 N.W.2d 569, 570 (Minn. Ct. App. 2004).
266. Michael C. Grossman, Is This Arbitration?: Religious Tribunals, Judicial
Review, and Due Process, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 169, 179 (2007) (quoting Abdul
Wahid Sheikh Osman, Islamic Arbitration Courts in America & Canada?,
http://www.hiiraan.com/op/eng/2005/dec/Prof Abdulwahid211205.htm).
267. H.R. 1056, 52nd Leg., 2nd Reg. Sess. (Okla. 2010), available at
https://www.sos.ok.gov/documents/questions/755.pdf ("[T]he courts shall not
consider ... Sharia law.").
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At the outset, as argued above, a court is intellectually competent
to decide what is required under any legal system, religious or
268
otherwise. However, because courts are not institutionally competent
to settle disputes internal to a religion, the decision in this example might
look no different if the litigants were Christian or Jewish and the contract
called for interpretation according to the dictates of those religions.
Because under the religious question doctrine the courts would be no
more constrained with respect to Sharia law than to any other religious
law, it appears that the Oklahoma provision would have no effect in this
example beyond expressing the kind of disfavor discussed above.
In a second example, the two parties write a contract and include
an arbitration clause that states that Sharia law will govern the
arbitration, and that the arbitration will be performed by a specific
Islamic arbitration tribunal. Both parties again admit the force of the
contract but litigate their separate views of their obligations before the
designated tribunal. This time, a religious tribunal to which both parties
have submitted themselves chooses the prevailing interpretation and
makes its award. The losing party then asks an Oklahoma court to vacate
that award.
"Judicial review of an arbitration award is among the narrowest
known to the law."26 9 There are, however, a limited number of statutory
bases upon which a court may vacate an arbitral award (confirming, as
opposed to vacating, an award will be considered immediately below).270
268. See supra notes 133-36 and accompanying text.
269. 86 AM. JUR. TRIALS 1 H § 244 (2002) (quoting Gupta v. Cisco Systems,
Inc., 274 F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 2001) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)).
270. The Oklahoma Uniform Arbitration Act provides as follows:
A. Upon an application and motion to the court by a party to
an arbitration proceeding, the court shall vacate an award made
in the arbitration proceeding if:
1. The award was procured by corruption, fraud, or other
undue means;
2. There was:
a. evident partiality by an arbitrator appointed as a
neutral arbitrator,
b. corruption by an arbitrator, or
c. misconduct by an arbitrator prejudicing the rights of a
party to the arbitration proceeding;
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One judicially created basis that has been discussed is "manifest
disregard of the law."271 This phrase may or may not carry any meaning
272
independent of the statutory grounds. Specifically, it may refer to the
statutory provisions implicated when "when the arbitrators were 'guilty
of misconduct' or 'exceeded their powers."'273 The Second Circuit
provided this explanation of manifest disregard of the law:
[I]t clearly means more than error or
misunderstanding with respect to the law. The error
must have been obvious and capable of being
readily and instantly perceived by the average
person qualified to serve as an arbitrator.
Moreover, the term 'disregard' implies that the
arbitrator appreciates the existence of a clearly
governing legal principle but decides to ignore or
pay no attention to it.274
Let us suppose that the arbitrator in the Islamic arbitration
tribunal mentioned in the second example makes his decision in a
manner that would ordinarily present grounds for vacation of the award.
Perhaps the arbitrator "appreciates the existence of a clearly governing
3. An arbitrator refused to postpone the hearing upon
showing of sufficient cause for postponement, refused to
consider evidence material to the controversy, or otherwise
conducted the hearing contrary to Section 6 of this act, so
as to prejudice substantially the rights of a party to the
arbitration proceeding;
4. An arbitrator exceeded the arbitrator's powers;
5. There was no agreement to arbitrate, unless the person
participated in the arbitration proceeding without raising
the objection under subsection C of Section 16 of this act
not later than the beginning of the arbitration hearing; or
6. The arbitration was conducted without proper notice of
the initiation of an arbitration as required in Section 10 of
this act so as to prejudice substantially the rights of a party
to the arbitration proceeding.
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1874 (West 2010).
271. Hall St. Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 584 (2008).
272. Id. at 585.
273. Id. at 576 (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 10(a) (2006)).
274. Carte Blanche (Singapore) Pte., Ltd. v. Carte Blanche Intern., Ltd., 888
F.2d 260, 265 (2nd Cir. 1989) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
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legal principle but decides to ignore or pay no attention to it."275 Such
behavior would surely be grounds for vacation under the Oklahoma
provision dealing with "misconduct by an arbitrator prejudicing the
rights of a party to the arbitration proceeding."276 However, if
establishing grounds for vacation in court required establishing a clearly
governing legal principle of Sharia, it would be impossible to accomplish
without offending the Oklahoma anti-Sharia amendment. In this instance,
the unjust decision of the Islamic tribunal would not be subject to
vacation, because the court would be prevented from the required review
of Sharia.
As with the first example, it is necessary to determine whether
the religious question doctrine would prevent such a review no matter
which religion was involved. In this instance, it appears that the religious
question doctrine would not prevent such a review. As discussed above,
courts frequently make evaluations of doctrines and practices to
determine which warrant First Amendment protection.27 For instance, a
court has decided that it is constitutionally necessary to allow prison
inmates access to prohibited literature because of its religious content.278
Such evaluations are necessary in order for the court to provide the
religious protections called for by the Constitution. Because of the high
hurdle of establishing "manifest disregard for the law," or, for example,
the statutory tests of "misconduct by an arbitrator," or "exceed[ing] the
arbitrator's powers," and because the court can vacate an award and
order a rehearing before the same arbitrator or a new arbitrator,279 the
risk of the state being forced to make decisions that impermissibly affect
religious practice would seem to be mitigated. The Second Circuit's
discussion of "manifest disregard" is instructive; the question whether
"the arbitrator appreciates the existence of a clearly governing legal
275. Id. at 265.
276. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1874(2)(c) (West 2010).
277. Jared A. Goldstein, Is There A "Religious Question" Doctrine? Judicial
Authority to Examine Religious Practices and Beliefs, 54 CATH. U. L. REv. 497, 538
(2005) ("[C]ourts routinely undertake extensive fact-finding into the content of
religious doctrines and practices in determining whether a practice or doctrine is
'religious' and therefore subject to the protections of the Religion Clauses and
statutes addressing religion.").
278. Sutton v. Rasheed, 323 F.3d 236, 252 (3d Cir. 2003).
279. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1874.
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principle but decides to ignore or pay no attention to it" is not one of fine
doctrinal points.280 The decision whether a principle "clearly governs,"
even within a religious context, is more analogous to the decision
whether a stated belief is a religion deserving the protection of the Free
Exercise Clause, than it is analogous to the decision of which of two
competing religious views is the more orthodox. The remedies show the
safety. If the court finds that the principle does not clearly govern or that
it was not ignored, it defers to the tribunal and does not vacate the
award.281 If it finds that the principle is crucial and that the tribunal
282
ignored it, the court can vacate the award and order a rehearing. In
neither case does it arrogate to itself broad religious authority.
Another possible ground of vacation under Oklahoma law is that
an arbitrator "refused to consider evidence material to the
controversy."283 Michael Grossman points out that "[i]n religious
tribunals, rulings on admissibility of evidence are determined by
religious law." 284 Thus, it might seem that an examination of the
admissibility of evidence by a reviewing court would entail an
impermissible religious question. However, again it appears that this
situation does not present an impermissible religious question.
Presumably, a tribunal's determination of the admissibility of certain
evidence under religious law entails some level of consideration of that
evidence, just as a court's determination of the admissibility of evidence
for trial entails consideration of the proffered evidence in light of court
rules. Thus, by explaining the basis for the inadmissibility of the
evidence, a tribunal arguably shows that it considered the evidence, even
if, for reasons of religious law, the tribunal did not allow the evidence to
influence the outcome of the its decision.
280. Carte Blanche, 888 F.2d at 265 ("Judicial inquiry under the 'manifest
disregard' standard is ... extremely limited. The governing law alleged to have been
ignored by the arbitrators must be well defined, explicit, and clearly applicable. We
are not at liberty to set aside an arbitration panel's award because of an arguable
difference regarding the meaning or applicability of laws urged upon it." (quoting
Merril Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Bobker, 808 F.2d 930, 933-34 (2d
Cir. 1986))).
28 1. Id.
282. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1874.
283. Id.
284. Grossman, supra 266, at 195.
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In cases where neither party asks the court to vacate the arbitral
award, the prevailing party in the arbitration can apply to a court to
285confirm the award. Confirmation provides the prevailing party with an
286
enforceable judgment. Not surprisingly, confirmation, absent a motion
for vacation, does not require the court to make a searching legal analysis
of the underlying arbitral award.287 The relevant Oklahoma statute
provides:
After a party to an arbitration proceeding receives
notice of an award, the party may make an
application and motion to the court for an order
confirming the award at which time the court shall
issue a confirming order unless the award is
modified or corrected pursuant to Section 21 or 25
of this act or is vacated pursuant to Section 24 of
this act.288
The modification contemplated under Section 21 is made by the
arbitrator, not the court.289 The correction contemplated under Section 25
is made by the court, but does not implicate fine doctrinal points. 290
Section 24 is the section dealing with vacation, previously
considered.291 Far from giving courts broad powers to second-guess
285. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1873 (West 2010).
286. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1876 (West 2010).
287. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1873.
288. Id. (emphasis added).
289. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1871 (West 2010).
290. Rather, Section 25 gives the court powers to modify an award in
circumstances involving the following situations:
1. There was an evident mathematical miscalculation or an
evident mistake in the description of a person, thing, or
property referred to in the award;
2. The arbitrator has made an award on a claim not submitted
to the arbitrator and the award may be corrected without
affecting the merits of the decision upon the claims submitted;
or
3. The award is imperfect in a matter ofform not affecting the
merits of the decision on the claims submitted.
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1875 (West 2010) (quoting a portion of the provision)
(emphasis added).
291. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1874 (West 2010).
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arbitral awards, the Oklahoma statute provides that a court "shall issue a
confirming order" except when a party has moved for vacation, or in a
small number of other narrow, extreme circumstances.2 92
In short, it appears that the level of consideration necessary for a
court to review the award of a religious arbitral tribunal, whether to
confirm or vacate, does not rise to the level of implicating the religious
question doctrine. Thus, it would not prevent the full and free use of
religious arbitration to Christian, Jewish, or other religious litigants.
However, the Oklahoma amendment goes further than the religious
question doctrine, and forbids any court consideration of Sharia law.293
As such, it would disallow a court to vacate even the clearest cases of
abuse by a tribunal. However, Islam is not the only religion to offer
religious arbitration. 294 The fact that court protection in such a scenario
would be available to a Christian, a Jew, or any other religious litigant
other than a Muslim (or any individual electing arbitration under Sharia
law) shows that the effect of the amendment would be to deny Muslims
the equal protection of the law in the context of arbitration.
Because the Oklahoma amendment forbids any court
consideration of Sharia law, it would disallow Muslim litigants court
protection in certain cases of arbitral abuse. It is possible, though not
certain, that courts would see this as a due process violation and simply
292. See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1873 (emphasis added).
293. See id.
294. A Christian conciliation clause providing for Christianity-based
arbitration follows:
The parties to this agreement are Christians and believe that
the Bible commands them to make every effort to live at peace
and to resolve disputes with each other in private or within the
Christian church (see Matthew 18:15-20; Corinthians 6:1-8).
Therefore the parties agree that any claim or dispute arising
from or related to this agreement shall be settled by biblically
based mediation and, if necessary, legally binding arbitration
in accordance with the Rules of Procedure for Christian
Conciliation of the Institute for Christian Conciliation, a
division of Peacemaker Ministries.
Margaret G. Tebo, Dispute Resolution Clauses Keep the Faith Many Clients Asking
for Mediation Under Christian Principles, PRIVATE DISPUTE RESOLUTION SERVICES,
http://www.privatedisputeresolutionservices.com/christianmediation.html (last
visited Jan. 31. 2012).
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disallow the confirmation of such arbitral awards. Muslim litigants will,
as such, find themselves caught between a rock and a hard place: they
will either have access to court-enforceable Islamic arbitration, but no
protection in case of an unfair award, given in manifest disregard of the
law; or they may be denied any binding Islamic arbitration option.
This dilemma, based as it is on religious status, offends First
Amendment religious liberty values. First, part of the purpose of the
Oklahoma amendment, as explained by its author, Rex Duncan, was to
prevent parties from being able to enter into court-enforced arbitration
agreements in order to be bound by Islamic law.295 The law was not
designed to prevent any other form of religious arbitration. Christian,
Jewish, and Islamic groups all provide for some form of religious
296
arbitration. In fact, some Christians and Muslims practice religious
arbitration of one kind or another as a tenet of their faith. Thus, it
295. See supra note 264 and accompanying text.
296. For an example of a contractual agreement to appear before a Jewish
religious body, see Avitzur v. Avitzur, 58 N.Y.2d 108 (N.Y. 1983).
297. In the Christian context, see the following biblical quotation:
If any of you has a dispute with another, do you dare to take it
before the ungodly for judgment instead of before the Lord's
people? Or do you not know that the Lord's people will judge
the world? And if you are to judge the world, are you not
competent to judge trivial cases? Do you not know that we will
judge angels? How much more the things of this life!
Therefore, if you have disputes about such matters, do you ask
for a ruling from those whose way of life is scorned in the
church? I say this to shame you. Is it possible that there is
nobody among you wise enough to judge a dispute between
believers? But instead, one brother takes another to court-and
this in front of unbelievers!
1 Corinthians 6:1-6, New International Version.
In the Muslim context, see the following quotation from a Florida trial court order:
Based upon the testimony before the court at this time, under
ecclesiastical law, pursuant to the Quran, Islamic brothers
should attempt to resolve a dispute among themselves. If
Islamic brothers are unable to do so, they can agree to present
the dispute to the greater community of Islamic brothers within
the mosque or the Muslim community for resolution. If that is
not done or does not result in a resolution of the dispute, the
dispute is to be presented to an Islamic judge for
determination, and that is or can be an A'lim.
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appears the government of Oklahoma has acted with the purpose of
disfavoring one religion, Islam. Even if this purpose was a secondary
purpose, the Supreme Court has stated that "'if the purpose or effect of a
law is to impede the observance of one or all religions or is to
discriminate invidiously between religions, that law is constitutionally
invalid even though the burden may be characterized as being only
indirect."' 298 In the case of the Oklahoma amendment, Muslims are
forced to choose between religiously mandated behavior and receipt of a
government benefit, the court enforcement and procedural protection of
Sharia-based arbitration.
It might be argued that Oklahoma's complete hands-off policy
toward Sharia law represents an appropriate deference to religious
authorities in religious matters. Certainly, by the terms of the
amendment, the state refuses to arrogate to itself any authority on matters
of Sharia law as such.299 However, because the amendment strips away
the benefit of religious arbitration rights to Muslims, the state cannot be
said to defer to religious authorities so much as to decimate the weight of
that authority as it pertains to agreements between Muslims. If Muslims
are denied the right, afforded to other religious groups, to have fair and
court-enforceable Islamic arbitration, one of three results may obtain.
Either Muslims must forego civilly binding appeals to religious authority
or Muslims must risk submitting to Islamic tribunals without the due
process protections given to all other parties to arbitration; or Islamic
tribunals must seek to enforce their decisions themselves. If Muslims
know that they cannot seek either enforcement or protection from
manifest disregard of the law in the context of Islamic tribunals, many
may simply stop using them. This result would not represent government
deference to religious authority, but rather, government destruction of
Richard A. Nielson, Trial Court Opinion in Mansour v. Islamic Educ. Ctr. of Tampa,
Inc., THIRTEENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT, (Mar. 22, 2011), available at
http://www.fljud13.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket-Gou7OXZCgll%3d&tabid=667&
mid= 1031.
298. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 404 (1963) (quoting Braunfeld v.
Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 607 (1961)).
299. H.R. 1056, 52nd Leg., 2nd Reg. Sess. (Okla. 2010), available at
https://www.sos.ok.gov/documents/questions/755.pdf By providing that "the courts
shall not consider . . . Sharia Law," the amendment forecloses the possibility of
courts attempting to interpret Sharia law. See id.
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religious authority. Islamic tribunals, like Christian and Jewish tribunals
(and arbitration tribunals generally), have very few tools of enforcement.
Another First Amendment argument against destroying Islamic
arbitration recognizes the importance of allowing all religions to provide
and communicate their distinctive solutions to life's problems. One of
the freedoms protected by the Free Exercise Clause is the "right . . . to
disseminate religious views." 30 0 If Muslims do not have access to
arbitration on the same terms as other religions, they cannot fairly
demonstrate in the public square the merits of their distinctive normative
solutions to the problems of life. The reason for this is that religious
arbitration provides a government sanctioned and protected safe space in
which to attempt and demonstrate the effectiveness and attractiveness of
a religion's norms. Under the Oklahoma amendment, Islamic norms
simply cannot be demonstrated and attempted on equal terms as those
that are afforded to other religions.
This, in turn, works against the Establishment Clause value that
government should neither adopt nor reject laws solely on the basis of
their religious merit or status. When Muslims are denied the ability to
demonstrate the appeal of their normative religious solutions, they
operate at an explicit and unfair disadvantage in seeking the legislative
enactment of their ideas. In short, because Muslims are prevented from
demonstrating their best ideas, solely on the basis that the label of Sharia
taints those ideas, the government is indirectly rejecting laws solely on
the basis of their religious status.
Finally, and perhaps most obviously, the denial to Muslims of
equal protection in the context of arbitration tribunals directly impedes
their ability to order their lives according to their religious beliefs. When
Islamic tribunals are denied the government protection, either of
enforcement or of vacation in the face of manifest disregard of the law,
they lose legitimacy and adjudicative power. Muslims are then forced to
choose between deficient religious tribunals or the legal standards of
outsiders to their faith. While not all personal desires for methods of
obtaining justice are likely to be met in any governmental system, the
emphasis that the United States has traditionally placed on religious
liberty demands that religious groups be provided a more effective
system.
300. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 304 (1940).
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CONCLUSION
As demonstrated by Part II's extensive discussion of religious
arbitration and the ways in which civil courts deal with arbitral decisions,
there are numerous safeguards against would-be infringements on
constitutional Tights embedded in the American legal system. As
discussed above, arbitral decisions are vacated when, for example, there
is evidence of manifest disregard for the law, or when the arbitrator
refused to consider material evidence.
The crucial feature of any kind of arbitration is that an arbitrator,
whether religious or not, has no ability to enforce the arbitral decision;
only state or federal courts have that power. In deciding whether to
enforce arbitral awards, civil courts first review whether the parties
agreed to take part in the arbitration of their own free will. Courts also
review the arbitral decision to ensure that arbitrators are neutral,o30 and
that the resulting arbitral decisions are neither grossly unfair 30 nor
undermine public policy.303 There is thus already an array of carefully
crafted safeguards in place to protect individuals.
These built-in protections to the U.S. legal system expose the
rhetoric invoked by anti-Sharia campaigners as nothing more than
mythical. Such baseless rhetoric is not only creating fear about a largely
innocent religious minority, it is also helping translate that fear into
problematic laws. These laws in the short term threaten the religious
liberty of Muslims, but in their broader implication affect the religious
freedom of all Americans.
301. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1874 (West 2010).
302. See Legacy Trading Co. v. Hoffinan, 627 F. Supp. 2d 1260, 1268 (W.D.
Okla. 2008) (rev'd in part on other grounds) ("[A]n arbitration panel must conduct
itself in a manner which does not deny a party fundamental fairness").
303. See id. at 1265 ("'The public policy exception is rooted in the common
law doctrine of a court's power to refuse to enforce a contract that violates public
policy or law. It derives legitimacy from the public's interest in having its views
represented in matters to which it is not a party but which could harm the public
interest."' (quoting Seymour v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield, 988 F.2d 1020, 1023 (10th
Cir. 1993))).
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